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ABSTRACT 
Planning for offshore hydrocarbon development in Canada’s Beaufort Sea currently occurs on a 
project-by-project basis.  This is despite a collective understanding that impact assessment 
should go beyond the evaluation of site-specific project impacts to consider the broader policy 
and regional planning context in which development projects operate.  The need for such a 
regional and strategic approach to impact assessment in Canada’s Beaufort Sea, known as 
regional strategic environmental assessment (R-SEA), arises from the looming large-scale 
offshore hydrocarbon development in the region and the lack of a mechanism to plan for future 
energy development, establish a long-term regional vision, or assess and effectively manage the 
potential cumulative environmental and social effects arising from development.  At such a 
critical moment, little research exists to advance R-SEA from a concept to an applied planning, 
assessment and decision-support process.  This dissertation draws on experience from the 
implementation of strategic environmental assessment in offshore jurisdictions internationally, 
along with existing initiatives for marine planning in the Beaufort Sea, to advance effective R-
SEA implementation in the region.  
 
The research methodology includes a literature review, case reviews and key informant 
interviews.  The research results are reported in three manuscripts. The first manuscript examines 
the influence of R-SEA on planning and development decisions in Norway, Atlantic Canada and 
the UK.  The second manuscript examines existing planning, assessment, and science initiatives 
in the Beaufort Sea.  The third manuscript identifies key opportunities for, and challenges to, the 
implementation of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea. Significant findings demonstrate that R-SEA can 
offer a much-needed framework to accommodate and address stakeholder issues and concerns 
regarding future offshore development in the Beaufort Sea, despite acute implementation 
challenges, such as scepticism of scenario-based planning.  Key findings reveal many 
expectations of what R-SEA could deliver in the Beaufort Sea, a result of the varied stakeholder 
priorities and goals.  Understanding the root of different expectations and perceptions, ensuring 
follow-up programs pay attention to horizontal linkages between R-SEA strategies and current 
marine planning initiatives, and that supporting institutional arrangements are in place for a 
preferred strategy to succeed lie at the core of advancing R-SEA as a viable tool in the Arctic. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Purpose and Objectives 
Previous research has shown that a strategic and regional approach to environmental assessment 
(EA) is needed in the context of offshore hydrocarbon planning and development (see BSStRPA 
2008; Davey et al. 2000; Horvath and Barnes 2004; Kinn 1999), where projects operate in a large 
infrastructure network and the risks to marine environments are often high and of global 
relevance (Campagna et al. 2011; Wagner and Armstrong 2010).  By their very nature, offshore 
energy projects require regional and strategic coordination (Spiridonov 2006; WWF 2005; Salter 
and Ford 2001).  There are now various forms of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) for 
offshore energy planning and impact assessment ongoing internationally in Norway, the United 
Kingdom, Atlantic Canada and the United States (see Fidler and Noble 2012; Hasle et al. 2009; 
Wagner and Jones 2004).  Yet, in Canada's western Arctic, an emerging energy frontier, 
planning for offshore hydrocarbon development continues to occur on a project-by-project basis 
(Doelle et al. 2012; Voutier et al. 2008). 
Part of the challenge to advancing strategic environmental assessment is that a basic 
understanding of what a strategic approach to EA is and what it should deliver is still far from 
consolidated (Noble 2009; Vicente and Partidário 2006; von Seht 1999).  To date, the majority of 
research on SEA has focused on sectoral applications of SEA in land use planning (Jones et al. 
2005), transportation (Fischer 2006), and forestry (Gachechiladze et al. 2009). Research on SEA 
in the energy sector has focused on terrestrial systems (see Jay 2010; Noble 2008; Marshall and 
Fischer 2006; Noble 2002), but with very little empirical research on SEA offshore, particularly 
with respect to oil and gas development.  This dissertation advances SEA in the energy sector by 
examining implementation challenges and opportunities of regional SEA (R-SEA) in Canada’s 
western Arctic Beaufort Sea.  Although R-SEA is gaining international momentum, the potential 
role of R-SEA in facilitating regional energy planning and impact assessment for offshore oil and 
gas development in Canada’s Arctic remains to be evaluated.  
The overall purpose of this research is to identify how a R-SEA framework could be used 
in the Beaufort Sea region to influence planning and development decisions in a broader, more 
2 !
regional socioeconomic and environmental context than the current project-based EA approach.  
Specifically, through identifying key implementation challenges and opportunities based on the 
perceptions of stakeholders, this research will provide a greater understanding of how to advance 
R-SEA to inform and improve the efficacy of environmental management decision-making in the 
Beaufort Sea.  The specific objectives of this research are to:  
i. examine offshore SEA frameworks internationally to identify operational challenges and 
opportunities and their influence on oil and gas planning and decision-making; 
ii. identify stakeholder perceptions regarding challenges and opportunities of current marine 
planning, assessment and science initiatives in Canada’s western Arctic to ascertain 
whether and how these initiatives enable horizontal and vertical integration and 
effectively facilitate marine resource planning and decision-making; and 
iii. identify key opportunities for, and challenges to, implementation of R-SEA in the 
Beaufort Sea based on a normative model and stakeholder expectations of R-SEA. !
1.2 Environmental Assessment 
Environmental assessment is broadly defined as a tool for identifying, predicting, evaluating, and 
mitigating the potential environmental impacts of a specific development project before major 
decisions and commitments about that project are made (Hanna 2009).  The primary purpose of 
EA is to facilitate the consideration of the environment in planning and decision-making and, 
ultimately, to make it possible to arrive at decisions and actions that are more environmentally 
sustainable (Noble 2009).  Originating from the US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
of 1969, which came into force in 1970, EA is currently amongst the most widely practiced 
environmental management tools in the world (Noble 2009; Cashmore et al. 2008).  In Canada, 
EA emerged in the early 1970s as a policy requirement to screen for potential pollution effects of 
developments (Gibson 2002).  It was legislated at the federal level under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (1992), and recently revised in 2012.   
Environmental assessment has evolved considerably over the past 40 years (see 
Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch 2012); yet, despite its widespread international adoption it 
has been subject to much criticism (Bina 2007).  A main limitation identified in the EA literature 
is that EA is often implemented too late in the decision-making process to influence decisions 
about options for development (Vicente and Partidário 2006), or to explore alternative 
3 !
development futures (Gibson 2002; Partidário 2000).  The process is often considered reactive 
and constrained to the assessment of individual development projects, and to project-based 
decision-making (Partidário 2000), thus reducing its ability to effectively manage the impacts of 
development, particularly cumulative impacts, that typically occur at a regional scale (Harriman 
and Noble 2008; Duinker and Greig 2007; Duinker 1994). Noble (2010: 251) further argues that 
project-based EA “in the absence of more strategic and regional processes is inherently 
constrained in its ability to facilitate decisions about development that are consistent with the 
broader principles of sustainability.”  Other notable challenges to EA over the years include its 
inability to meet broad sustainability objectives due, in part, to its too late application to support 
decisions about the nature and types of development that should be pursued (e.g., Gibson 2002; 
von Seht 1999); limited public involvement early in the policy and planning process (e.g., 
Diduck and Sinclair 2002); and insufficient monitoring and follow-up to feed-back and influence 
broader decision making processes (e.g., O’Faircheallaigh 2010; Morrison-Saunders and Bailey 
1999).  
As a result of the shortcomings of EA solely at the project level, there has emerged 
recognition of the need for and potential benefits of a more strategic approach to impact 
assessment (e.g. Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005; Gibson 2002; Partidário 2000).  This is 
particularly the case in Canada, where project EA has become increasingly narrow in scope and 
application since its introduction in the early 1970s as a broad policy mandate (see Harriman 
Gunn and Noble 2009b), and with 2012 revisions to the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act that further reduce the scope, time frame for, and comprehensiveness of project EA 
applications (see Gibson 2012).  Such narrowing in the scope and reach of EA emphasizes the 
need for a much higher level policy, plan and program oriented approach to planning for, and 
assessing the impacts of resource development. 
 
1.3 Strategic Environmental Assessment 
Variably defined, SEA broadly refers to the EA of policies, plans and programs (PPPs) and their 
alternatives (Sadler and Verheem 1996).  An early and widely quoted definition of SEA, by 
Thérivel et al. (1992) is: “the formalised, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating 
the environmental impacts of a policy, plan or programme and its alternatives, including the 
preparation of a written report on the findings of that evaluation, and using the findings in 
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publicly accountable decision-making”.  SEA is not a single, predetermined tool; rather it is a 
suite of related tools (WWF 2005) that is best described as ‘one-concept, multiple forms’ (Tonk 
and Verheem 1998).  SEA is based on the premise that project-based EA, which in essence reacts 
to a proposed development, is not adequate alone to ensure sustainable development of the 
environment (Noble 2010).  SEA is a way of ensuring that downstream project planning and 
development occurs within the context of desirable outcomes that society want to achieve; it 
therefore addresses the sources rather than the symptoms of environmental change (Noble 2010).  
The key concept is that the SEA process focuses on assessing the potential environmental 
impacts of all types of proposed PPPs, and seeks to incorporate environmental considerations 
into the development of public policies.  Strategic approaches to assessment serve to advance EA 
beyond the scope and mandate of project-based assessment to an earlier, higher level of 
environmental planning and decision-making.  In this way, SEA is proactive, and under it 
questions like ‘what is the preferred option’ or ‘what is the desired attainable end’ are asked, 
rather than it being used to simply predict the most likely outcome of a predetermined type of 
project action (Noble 2002).  In principle, SEA is intended to have a tiered-forward effect, 
meaning that the benefits of SEA application to high level policies trickle down, affecting plans 
and programs, and eventually influencing decisions about individual projects (Fischer 1999).  
The SEA approach is comprehensive as it broadens the policy target from individual decisions to 
the sequence of associated plans and programs; incorporates sustainability principles in the 
policy making process; enables tiering of environmentally structured actions; provides better 
context for assessment of cumulative effects; and considers the short and long-term 
environmental consequences. 
SEA extends EA upstream, but at the same time it adopts a different set of principles and 
criteria from those used in project-based EA (Gunn and Noble 2011).  Guiding principles and 
criteria for SEA encompass three components (Noble 2009).  First, system components refer to 
the basic provisions and requirements for SEA and the position of SEA in the broader planning 
and decision-making environment (Noble 2010).  This includes establishing clear provisions to 
undertake SEA, and applying sustainable development guiding principles.  Second, procedural 
components address the methodological and process elements of SEA, such as alternatives, 
cumulative effects, monitoring, and participation and transparency.  Finally, results components 
refer to the overall influence of SEA on decision-making and subsequent EA, including the 
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opportunity for broader system-wide learning and process development (Noble 2009).  There is 
no single model of SEA that can be unequivocally applied (see Jones et al. 2005); rather, 
attention must be given to context, to regulatory opportunities and constraints, and to the tier of 
application (Noble 2010; Fischer 2002).  While a large number of SEA-type processes exist, 
applications do not always occur under the SEA nametag.  
The concept of evaluating the environmental impacts of PPP was first established under 
the US NEPA, which required an EA of proposed federal agency actions, constituting the first 
formal framework for both EA and SEA (Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch 2012; Jones et al. 
2005).  However, it was Wood and Djeddour who first coined the term SEA in 1989, referring to 
EAs appropriate to PPPs as more ‘strategic’ in nature than those applicable to individual 
development projects (Partidário 2000).  Since then, SEA has gained international recognition as 
a formal approach to impact assessment, separate from project EA, and promoted by a number of 
high profile international developments (Noble 2009) including the World Bank’s 
recommendation for policy EA, the report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (Our Common Future 1987), and the United Nations Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro 
(1992).  
In Canada, SEA has existed informally since the early 1980s, but it was not until 1990 
that SEA was formally introduced in Canada, by way of The Cabinet Directive on the 
Environment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals, which distinguished SEA from traditional 
project-based EA (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005).  The Directive was updated in 2004, 
providing procedural support to federal departments and agencies so as to ensure compliance 
with the Directive.  Under the Directive, every PPP proposal submitted to a Minister or Cabinet 
for approval, which may result in either positive or negative environmental effects, is required to 
have an SEA (CEAA 1999).  Outside the federal Cabinet Directive, however, no formal systems 
of SEA exist in Canada; applications largely have been limited to federal policy and program-
based initiatives (Noble 2009; Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005).  Further, although Canada is 
recognized internationally as a country that has made significant contributions to the 
development and advancement of SEA (see Sadler 2005), reviews of SEA practice and 
performance have concluded that SEA in Canada is not meeting its potential as a higher-order 
EA tool in support of sustainability (see Gibson 2002), and there remains a systematic separation 
of SEA from downstream regional and project-specific development decisions.  For instance, 
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Noble (2009: 146) reviewed 10 case applications of formal and non-formal SEA across Canada 
and found “considerable variability in SEA experience and value added,” adding that the 
systematic separation of SEA from downstream decision inputs, or project-based EA and 
assessment activities was particularly troubling. 
In 2008, in an attempt to improve the application of SEA and extend SEA beyond the 
formal federal Cabinet Directive, as a more regional-based planning approach to impact 
assessment, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) commissioned a 
research program to develop R-SEA. Developed based on SEA principles (see Vicente and 
Partidário 2006; Partidário 1996), R-SEA was a means to promote regionalized applications of 
SEA, outside the scope of the federal Directive, so as to be more contextually relevant to 
regional policy and planning needs.  
Formally adopted by the CCME (2009) as a regionalized model of SEA in Canada, R-
SEA is a process designed to systematically assess the potential environmental effects, including 
cumulative effects, of alternative strategic initiatives (or PPPs) for a particular region.  In this 
regard, R-SEA is focused on identifying and assessing alternative development futures for a 
region, rather than simply predicting and mitigating the impacts of individual projects, thus 
allowing for sustainability objectives and broad alternatives to be included in regional planning, 
development and management decision-making process (Harriman and Noble 2008).  The 
overall purpose of R-SEA is to allow for more informed regional development decisions in 
support of sustainability (CCME 2009).  Both SEA and R-SEA frameworks have similar 
objectives of integrating environmental considerations into higher-order decision-making 
processes and providing an early analysis of the relationships between PPPs.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, the terms R-SEA and SEA are used in manner consistent with the source literature 
and case studies examined; however, the explicit focus of the thesis is on R-SEA given the 
regional scale and planning level of interest (i.e., the Beaufort Sea).  
 
1.4 Energy Demand and Extraction 
Over the past 40 years, worldwide total primary energy consumption has almost doubled, 
growing from 4,672 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1973 to 8,677 Mtoe in 2010 (IEA 
2012a).  The International Energy Agency's World Energy Outlook for 2012 predicts that global 
energy demand will continue to increase in the coming decades, increasing by over one-third 
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between 2011 and 2035 (IEA 2012b). This increase in demand is driven primarily by emerging 
economies.  China accounts for the largest share of the growth in global energy use, with its 
demand predicted to rise 60% by 2035, followed by India (where demand more than doubles) 
and the Middle East.  In contrast, OECD energy demand in 2035 is predicted to be just 3% 
higher than in 2010 (IEA 2012b).  Fossil fuels are predicted to remain the principal sources of 
energy worldwide in 2035, although their combined share of the global energy mix is predicted 
to fall from 81% to 75% (IEA 2012b).  Global oil demand in International Energy Agency's 
principal scenario (New Policies Scenario) increases slowly from a total of 87.4 million barrels 
per day (mb/d) in 2011 to 99.7 mb/d in 2035, again driven by demand in China, which accounts 
for 50% of the net increase. 
Canada is a key player in today’s energy markets as the world’s fifth largest energy 
producer, sixth largest producer of crude oil, and third largest natural gas producer (CAPP 2012). 
Canada is also home to the third largest crude oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela (CAPP 2012).  Prime Minister Harper’s intention to transform Canada into an 
"energy superpower" was evident in his first speech as Prime Minister to business leaders outside 
of Canada, which occurred on July 14, 2006 to the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce in 
London.  This speech detailed how the emergence of Canada as an energy superpower would be 
rooted in the rapid expansion of the oil sands and increasing oil and gas development in the 
Arctic (Harper 2006).  Subsequent directives from the Harper Conservatives have asserted 
Canada’s importance as an energy superpower and the need to expand and diversify markets for 
Canada’s fossil fuels. 
The June 1997 Special Session of the UN General Assembly emphasized that sustainable 
patterns of energy production, distribution, and use are crucial to improvements in the quality of 
life (UNDP 2000).  The relationship between energy production and use and sustainable 
development can be viewed from two standpoints (Rogner and Popescu 2000).  First, energy 
availability provides an opportunity for prosperity, satisfying basic human needs, improving 
social welfare and economic development.  On the other hand, to meet sustainability criteria, the 
production and use of energy must not endanger the quality of life of current and future 
generations.  Today’s discussions on energy use are increasingly dominated by major global 
concerns of over-population, pollution, water depletion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and 
global climate deterioration (Lior 2010).  While such global challenges are of critical 
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importance, impacts from fossil fuel production and consumption still abound at smaller scales 
depending on the region of the world examined.  At the local scale, such impacts include air 
pollution arising from fossil fuel combustion, thermal pollution, and water use and 
contamination.  Examples of impacts at the regional scale include acid deposition and 
tropospheric ozone depletion (Holdren and Smith 2000). 
Oil and gas exploration and development are, and hold the potential to remain, the most 
significant engines of economic growth in the Canadian Arctic.  If managed correctly, 
hydrocarbon development can provide for the long-term prosperity of the Arctic communities 
and bring significant economic benefits to the rest of Canada (Voutier et al. 2008).  There are, 
nonetheless, concerns that other values, including maintenance of traditional lifestyles and 
protection of ecologically sensitive areas, must be safeguarded at regional and local levels 
(BSStRPA 2008).  Canada recognizes the importance of these issues and is attempting to 
approach northern resource development in a sustainable fashion, in part through the Arctic 
Council, and the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy (2009).  This policy has four 
interrelated objectives including protecting Canada’s environmental heritage, promoting 
economic and social development, exercising Canada’s sovereignty, and improving and 
devolving governance.  
!
1.4.1 Hydrocarbon Development in Canada’s Western Arctic 
Increasing interest in the development of western hydrocarbon resources, in particular Canada’s 
western Arctic, occurs in a broader political economy of energy.  This political economy is 
characterized by efforts to secure energy supplies in a future of increasing demand, amidst 
ongoing geopolitical instability, particularly in the Middle East.  Global concerns about future 
energy supplies combined with decreasing Arctic sea ice coverage in recent years has spurred 
interest in Arctic oil and gas reserves as a means to boost supply (Johnstone 2010).  For the oil 
and gas industry, Arctic and Subarctic regions are considered to be some of the world's last 
energy frontiers, increasingly important for meeting global energy demands (Nuttall 2008).  
According to the United States Geological Survey (2008), the Arctic contains around 25% of the 
world’s largest remaining untapped gas reserves and undeveloped oil reserves.  The discovered 
recoverable oil resource in the combined Mackenzie Delta - Beaufort Sea is between 1 billion 
barrels and 1.2 billion barrels, and the total recoverable oil resource may be as high as 10.6 
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billion barrels (Chen et al. 2007 in Callow 2012).  The estimated discoverable marketable gas 
resource in the combined Mackenzie Delta - Beaufort Sea is between 9 and 10.4 trillion cubic 
feet, and the ultimate marketable gas resource may be as high as 56.9 trillion cubic feet 
(Drummond 2009 in Callow 2012).  
The worldwide interest in Arctic hydrocarbons and the prospect of rising energy prices 
will likely guarantee a place for the Arctic in the investment plans of many transnational 
corporations (Beauregard-Tellier 2008).  Prior to 2007, the majority of hydrocarbon exploration 
and development in the Beaufort Region was restricted to the continental shelf and nearshore 
region.  In recent years, however, exploration licenses have been let in the deep offshore (Porta 
and Bankes 2011).  The development and application of new exploration technologies are 
increasing the discovered resource, with exploration now extending to deep water areas (INAC 
2010).  The deep slope region of the Beaufort Sea has not been explored or assessed; however, 
the recent issuance of exploration licenses with high value work commitments is a strong 
indication that industry believes this area has the potential to hold large accumulations of 
hydrocarbons (Callow 2012).  
The Beaufort Sea Large Ocean Management Area covers over one million km2, 
encompassing the marine portion of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Figure 1-1), and has been 
identified as one of five priority areas for integrated ocean management by the Government of 
Canada (Cobb et al. 2008).  The area contains the Tarium Niryutait Marine Protected Area and is 
rich in biological diversity, including benthic fauna, birds, marine and anadromous fish (e.g., 
arctic cod, arctic char, salmon), terrestrial mammals (e.g., caribou, arctic fox, lynx, arctic hare), 
and marine mammals (e.g., bowhead whales, beluga whales, ringed seal, walrus, polar bear) 
(Cobb et al. 2008).  The marine resources of the Beaufort Sea provide sustenance and have been 
part of Inuvialuit fishing and hunting practices for centuries.  
The Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR) was established as a result of the 1984 Inuvialuit 
Final Agreement (IFA) between six Arctic communities and the Government of Canada.  The 
IFA was the first land settlement in Canada to include land ownership, both surface and sub-
surface and the beds of water bodies.  The ISR covers 906,430 km2, of which the Inuvialuit own 
90,643 km2, with surface rights on 77,694 km2 and both surface and sub-surface rights on the 
remaining 12,949 km2 (Fast et al. 2005; IFA 1984) (Figure 1-1).  The region’s population, who 
are predominately Inuvialuit, is dispersed over six communities: Aklavik (approximate 
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population 630), Inuvik (approximate population 3590), Tuktoyaktuk (approximate population 
1010), Paulatuk (approximate population 312), Ulukhaktok (approximate population 420), and 
Sachs Harbour (Ikahuak) (approximate population 120) (Pearce et al. 2011).  Life is oriented 
toward the marine and terrestrial resources of the nearshore Beaufort Sea, and dependency on the 
region’s wildlife resources, such as seal, whale, fish, caribou, and muskoxen, remain strong 
(Pearce et al. 2011; Usher 2002).  
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Figure 1-1.  Inuvialuit Settlement Region of Canada’s Western Arctic 
Source: Map developed by Michael St. Louis, University of Saskatchewan 
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Under the IFA, the Inuvialuit ceded their rights in the offshore areas; however, they still 
provide input regarding offshore oil and gas development decisions on federal Crown lands in 
their settlement region and maintain a role and interest in offshore governance.  The IFA 
provides a framework for co-management in the ISR between the Inuvialuit and the federal 
government.  However, for all intents and purposes, the Government of Canada retains 
jurisdiction over and authority to manage the offshore resources of the Beaufort Sea, including 
the marine portion of the ISR.  The National Energy Board (NEB) and Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada (AANDC) have independent but complementary roles in energy 
exploration and development in the Beaufort Sea: the NEB authorizes drilling, while AANDC 
administers rights to oil exploration.  Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) manages development 
authorizations under the Fisheries Act (1985), and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(2012) applies to projects whenever a federal authority has a decision-making responsibility. 
Environmental assessment in the ISR is regulated under the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (2012) and the IFA (1984).  The federal Act provides the legislative framework 
for EA within the ISR; however, all developments in the ISR are subject to EA under the IFA, 
regardless of their size or magnitude of impact.  Currently, project-based EA is the primary tool 
for planning for, assessing, and managing the impacts of offshore energy exploration and 
development.  Challenges to the current approach to EA and regulation for offshore oil and gas 
in the Beaufort Sea have been documented by Ketilson (2011) and others (Doelle et al. 2012; 
Voutier et al. 2008; Erlandson and Sloan 2001).  These include the narrow scope of EA and 
limited reach beyond the individual development project, uncertainty and efficiency of the 
process, the potential for duplication of effort in project assessment, and the lack of capacity to 
implement EA and regulatory programs.  These limitations have generated considerable interest 
in regional and strategic approaches to offshore planning and assessment in the western Arctic, 
and are likely to be exacerbated by recent legislative and regulatory reforms to EA at the federal 
level in Canada (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012), which further limit the scope 
of EA application, including the exemption of small projects (e.g., exploration), and set 
maximum 24-month time frames for the review of large projects (e.g., offshore development).  
Notwithstanding current, independent programs in the western Arctic focused on marine 
planning (e.g., Integrated Ocean Management Plan), baseline studies (e.g., Beaufort Regional 
Environmental Assessment), and scientific understanding of climate change (e.g., Integrated 
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Regional Impact Studies), there is no integrative planning and impact assessment framework to 
support PPP development and decisions about marine resource use, particularly with regard to 
deep offshore exploration and development. 
The need for such a regional and strategic approach arises from the looming large-scale 
offshore hydrocarbon development in the region and the lack of a mechanism to plan for future 
energy development, establish a long-term regional vision, or assess and effectively manage the 
potential cumulative environmental and social effects arising from development (see Doelle et al. 
2012; Arctic Council 2009).  Furthermore, from the perspective of hydrocarbon engineering and 
coastal resource management, the delineation of onshore and offshore becomes blurred because 
much of the shallow Beaufort Sea is frozen in winter, making it indistinguishable from the 
nearby shore, and because directional drilling from onshore locations can penetrate targets at 
depth several kilometres offshore (Voutier et al. 2008).  Consequently, terrestrial and marine oil 
and gas activities in this region require a higher degree of coordination than anywhere else in 
Canada, if not the world (Voutier et al. 2008).  
As international attention turns to the Arctic to meet global energy demands, there is 
increased recognition of the need to upstream impact assessment and decision-making to plan for 
energy development prior to ramping-up individual energy projects (see Elvin and Fraser 2012; 
Arctic Council 2009; WWF 2005).  The urgency for R-SEA is great, given the shortcomings 
with the existing project-based approach (see Doelle et al. 2012) combined with recent 
legislative and regulatory reforms to EA in Canada at the federal level (see Gibson 2012), and 
Canada’s commitment to become an energy superpower (Hester 2007).  
 
1.5 Research Approach 
This research was approached in three phases, corresponding to the objectives described in 
Section 1.1, and adopted a mix of supporting research methods (Table 1-1).  The first phase of 
the research focused on international SEA offshore Norway, Atlantic Canada and the United 
Kingdom. An in-depth literature review was conducted to characterize and explain gaps in 
knowledge, assess the nature of work already performed on offshore R-SEA, and further refine 
the research questions and objectives.  The literature review focused on strategic and regional 
environmental assessment in resource management (e.g., definitions, concepts and approaches; 
purpose, principles, benefits; cases and applications), and regional environmental management 
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(e.g., ecosystem management; integrative management; regional planning and development) 
reported in international peer reviewed journal literature and ‘grey’ literature, including industry 
and government reports and publications.  In Norway the Barents Sea Integrated Management 
Plan 2006 was reviewed, along with the Goliat offshore energy development project. In the case 
of the United Kingdom, two offshore SEA’s were examined, along with the Laggan Tormore 
energy project.  In Atlantic Canada, SEAs performed by the Canadian Newfoundland Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board were examined.  A total of 20 interviews were also conducted with 
practitioners, regulators, industry representatives and environmental and other Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) directly involved in SEA offshore Norway, Atlantic 
Canada and the United Kingdom.  
The second phase of the research focused on marine planning in the Canadian Arctic.  A 
literature review was conducted on regional environmental planning (e.g., marine spatial 
planning, ecosystem management and regional planning and development) reported in 
international journal literature and ‘grey’ literature including regional planning documents and 
community plans.  Case examinations were conducted through document analysis of three 
current marine planning, assessment and science initiatives in the western Arctic, namely the 
Integrated Ocean Management Plan (IOMP), Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment 
(BREA), and Integrated Regional Impact Study (IRIS).  A total of 50 interviews were also 
completed with Inuvialuit co-management boards and agencies in the Inuvialuit Settlement 
Region (ISR) of the Beaufort Sea, municipal government, territorial and federal government, oil 
and gas industry representatives, private consultants, Environmental Non-governmental 
Organizations (ENGOs) and other energy interest groups.  Interview data were analyzed using 
QSR NVivo© v.9; a computer software program designed to classify and manage qualitative 
information.  Observation and participation at various conferences, including the ArcticNet IRIS 
Regional Workshop (Inuvik 2011) and the International Polar Year: From Knowledge to Action 
Conference (Montréal 2012), also contributed toward an overall understanding of each case 
reviewed.  
The third phase of the research focused on the potential for implementation of R-SEA in 
Canada’s western Arctic, specifically implementation opportunities and challenges.  A literature 
review was conducted on strategic and regional environmental assessment (e.g., definitions, 
concepts, and approaches in the CCME R-SEA framework) reported in international peer 
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reviewed journal literature and government reports and publications.  The 50 interviews from 
phase two, with Inuvialuit co-management boards and agencies in the ISR, municipal 
government, territorial and federal government, oil and gas industry representatives, private 
consultants, ENGOs and other energy interest groupss, were also used to support this third and 
final phase of the research. Interview data were again analyzed using QSR NVivo© v.9. 
 
Table 1-1.  Supporting Methods for Research Objectives 
Research Objectives 1.  International SEA 
Offshore 
2.  Marine Planning in 
the Arctic  
3.  Implementing R-SEA 
Supporting Research 
Methods 
Literature Review Literature Review Literature Review 
Case Examinations  Case Examinations Interviews 
Interviews  Observations   
 Interviews  
 
1.5.1 Ensuring Quality and Validity of Research 
The interview protocol used in this research was approved and conducted under the terms of the 
University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Ethics Board.  An Aurora Research Institute license to 
conduct research in the Northwest Territories, pursuant to the NWT Scientists Act (1988), was 
also secured. Confidentiality was maintained to the extent possible in reporting all of the 
information presented in this dissertation.  The names of individual participants are not reported, 
but the names of the participant’s organization or affiliation are presented so as to ensure 
credibility of the results.  Efforts were also taken to preserve the credibility and validity of the 
qualitative data collected. Shenton (2004) argues that issues of validity of qualitative studies 
should be linked to trustworthiness, which can be achieved by the rigor through which the 
researcher has presented their material, making visible the practices of research, thus making it 
‘auditable’.  Four widely applied and accepted criteria in qualitative research, proposed by Guba 
(1981), were adopted in this thesis to ensure trustworthiness (see Shenton 2004).  First, to 
achieve ‘credibility’ several provisions were made by the author, including adoption of widely 
accepted and adopted methods of inquiry in the field of impact assessment (e.g., see Bina 2008a; 
Runhaar and Driessen 2007; Diduck and Sinclair 2002) and community research (Gearhead and 
Shirley 2007), triangulation via use of different methods and research participants, debriefing 
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sessions between the researcher and supervisor, and peer scrutiny of the project (e.g., committee 
meetings and presenting material at nation and international conferences).  Second, to 
accomplish ‘transferability’ the research provided a rich description of background data to 
establish context for the study and detailed descriptions of phenomena in question to allow 
comparisons to be made.  Third, to achieve ‘dependability’, overlapping methods were employed 
and a detailed methodological description was provided to allow the study to be repeated.  
Finally, to address ‘confirmability’, triangulation occurred to reduce effect of investigator bias 
and admissions of researcher limitations are cited (see Chapter 5).  
 
1.6 Theoretical and Conceptual Perspective 
SEA, as defined by Thérivel et al. (1992), is a systematic and comprehensive process for 
evaluating the environmental impacts of a PPP and its alternatives.  However, since its inception 
there has been division amongst scholars and practitioners on fundamental matters regarding 
SEA’s purpose and role in the planning process (Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch 2012).  Is it 
intended to safeguard environmental concerns, foster sustainability, or support balanced 
decision-making taking into account all normative issues and interests (Thissen 2001)?  
Partidário (2005) concluded that SEA has transformed from an impact assessment tool to a 
process that facilitates strategic and integrative thinking in decision-making.  Bina (2007) 
reached a similar conclusion, stating that SEA has evolved into a process for actively shaping 
and formulating strategic initiatives.  Nevertheless, it is likely that the role and aims of SEA will 
vary according to the planning and decision-making context in which it is applied (Fundingsland 
Tetlow and Hanusch 2012).  As a result, SEA has been regarded as ‘a family of approaches’ 
(Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005), and as an ‘overarching concept rather than a unitary technique’ 
(Brown and Thérivel 2000).  In this thesis, SEA is regarded as a process to support the 
sustainable development of the oil and gas resource in the Beaufort Sea through strategic 
planning that balances the views and interests of the various stakeholders. 
The nature of and links between science, society and technology have changed 
considerably since EA’s inception (Cashmore et al. 2008).  Literature offers two main 
interpretations of the role of science in EA: EA as applied science, and EA as civic science 
(Cashmore 2004).  Though these broad theoretical perspectives are somewhat extreme 
interpretations, they provide valuable reference points to explain the perspective adopted in this 
16 !
research.  The notion that science is an entirely rational process of objective inquiry was the 
predominant perspective when EA was conceived in the late 1960s (Cashmore 2004).  With the 
evolution of EA there has been a transition in practice from a strictly rational-technical paradigm 
to forms that also involve transactive, communicative and civic-oriented strategies (Gauthier et 
al. 2010; Armitage 2005).  The civic spectrum is akin to the belief that EA is a decision tool used 
to empower stakeholders and allow them to play a role in promoting social justice.  Social values 
are emphasized in the civic science perspective, and there is a role for both natural and social 
sciences, and facts and judgments (Cashmore 2004).  This thesis is situated in the middle of the 
two perspectives, where applied science values are upheld and recognized as important to 
applied EA, but with a strong civic approach that accommodates social sciences and 
participatory decision-making as part of the planning and assessment process.  This approach is 
particularly relevant in the Beaufort Sea region, where the IFA co-management framework 
already seeks to integrate the findings of applied science with traditional knowledge, and there is 
a strong focus on deliberation and participation in decision-making.  The value of using applied 
science to inform decisions is well recognized, but there is also value in accommodating 
divergent interests and stakeholder values, such as traditional subsistence, conservation, and 
hydrocarbon development, in developing a strategic plan for resource development in the region. 
Features of this theoretical positioning are reflected in the methodological approach taken 
in this study, as well as the nature of the research questions.  By nature, R-SEA is a process 
oriented toward integrating environmental considerations into higher-order decision-making, and 
it depends both on quality data to support its application and contextual considerations of socio-
political factors.  
 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
This thesis adopts a dissertation by manuscript style, formatted according to the requirements of 
the Department of Geography and Planning and the College of Graduate Studies and Research.  
Following the introductory chapter the thesis is organized into three manuscripts, each of which 
is presented as a single thesis chapter.  The first manuscript (Chapter 2), “Advancing Strategic 
Environmental Assessment in the Offshore Oil and Gas Sector: Lessons from Norway, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom” (Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2012, 34: 12-21), 
examines the efficacy of SEA offshore, in particular its influence on planning and development 
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decisions.  The second manuscript (Chapter 3), “Stakeholder Perceptions of Current Planning, 
Assessment and Science Initiatives in Canada’s Beaufort Sea” (Arctic, accepted for publication) 
examined how existing planning, assessment and initiatives in Canada’s western Arctic work to 
facilitate a more coordinated and informed approach to planning, assessment and decision-
making for sustainable offshore development in the offshore region. The third manuscript 
(Chapter 4), “Advancing Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment in Canada’s Western 
Arctic: Implementation Opportunities and Challenges” (Journal or Environmental Assessment 
Policy and Management, 2013, 15: 1) identified key opportunities for and challenges to the 
implementation of R-SEA in Canada’s Beaufort Sea. Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, revisits 
the main lessons and observations emerging from each manuscript and considers the larger 
implications as a body of research.  The relevance of these findings is then discussed within the 
broader research context.  The thesis concludes with future directions for research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ADVANCING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN THE OFFSHORE 
OIL AND GAS SECTOR: LESSONS FROM NORWAY, CANADA, AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
!
Preface to Chapter 2 
This Chapter addresses the first objective of the thesis, to examine offshore SEA frameworks 
internationally and identify operational challenges and opportunities and their influence on oil 
and gas planning and decision-making.  The Chapter has been published in the journal 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2012, 34: 12-21, co-authored by Fidler (lead author) 
and Noble.  
 
 
Abstract !
Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) for offshore oil and gas planning and development is 
utilized in select international jurisdictions, but the sector has received limited attention in the 
SEA literature.  While the potential benefits of and rationale for SEA are well argued, there have 
been few empirical studies of SEA processes for the offshore sector. Hence, little is known about 
the efficacy of SEA offshore, in particular its influence on planning and development decisions.  
This manuscript examines SEA practice and influence in three international offshore systems: 
Norway, Atlantic Canada and the United Kingdom, with the intent to identify the challenges, 
lessons and opportunities for advancing SEA in offshore planning and impact assessment.  
Results demonstrate that SEA can help inform and improve the efficacy and efficiency of 
project-based assessment in the offshore sector, however weak coordination between higher and 
lower tiers limit SEA's ability to influence planning and development decisions in a broad 
regional environmental and socioeconomic context. 
 
 
 !
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2.1 Introduction 
The shift from managing individual projects to more regional and integrative approaches has 
begun to take root internationally in environmental management.  This is also the case in 
environmental assessment (EA), which has been subject to much criticism for its focus on 
individual project actions (see Harriman Gunn and Noble 2009a; Cashmore et al. 2008).  The 
constraints of project-based EA are widely recognized and include inadequate consideration of 
cumulative effects and development thresholds (Duinker and Greig 2007); insufficient regional 
baseline data to detect environmental change (Dubé 2003); loss of mitigation opportunities 
because assessment occurred too late in the development sequence (Vicente and Partidário 
2006); and limited public influence over the direction of development activity (O’Faircheallaigh 
2010).  As a result, there is now a collective understanding that EA must go beyond the 
evaluation of site-specific project impacts to consider the broader policy and regional planning 
context in which development projects operate (Noble and Harriman 2008; Partidário 2000).  
The need for a strategic approach to EA is especially recognized in the context of 
offshore hydrocarbon planning and development (see BSStRPA 2008; Horvath and Barnes 2004; 
Kinn 1999; Davey et al. 2000;).  Offshore hydrocarbon projects operate in a large network of 
infrastructure; the risks to marine environments are often high on a global scale (Campagna et al. 
2011; Wagner and Armstrong 2010); and by their very nature such projects require regional and 
strategic coordination (Spiridonov 2006; WWF 2005; Salter and Ford 2001).  Public attention 
has typically been less concerned with offshore versus onshore energy developments (see 
Haggett 2011).  But, with recent spill events in the Gulf of Mexico drawing international 
attention to the offshore sector (see Amos 2011), there is a growing international debate about 
the risks and benefits of offshore hydrocarbon activity and the need for improved planning and 
impact assessment processes. 
Recognition of the limits of project-based EA in proactively planning and managing oil 
and gas activities in offshore environments has been instrumental to the adoption of regional and 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) systems (Environment Canada 2004; Horvath and 
Barnes 2004).  There are now various forms of SEA for offshore energy planning and impact 
assessment ongoing internationally (see Hasle et al. 2009; Wagner and Jones 2004).  However, 
while the potential benefits of and rationale for SEA are well argued (Johnson et al. 2011; 
CCME 2009; Harriman Gunn and Noble 2009a; Environment Canada 2004), there have been 
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few empirical investigations of SEA in the offshore oil and gas sector with a view to 
understanding the efficacy of SEA and, in particular, its influence on planning and development.  
The majority of research on SEA in general, and in the energy sector in particular, has focused 
on terrestrial systems (see Jay 2010; Noble 2008; Jackson and Dixon 2006; Marshall and Fischer 
2006; Noble 2002).  There has been very little consolidation of international experiences with 
SEA offshore, and thus few opportunities for transferable learning.  
There is a need for a better understanding of the nature and efficacy of SEA in the 
offshore energy sector and its role in planning and development decisions.  This is particularly 
important for emerging energy frontiers, such as Canada’s western Arctic, where planning for 
offshore hydrocarbon development continues to occur on a project-by-project basis (Voutier et 
al. 2008).  As international attention turns to the Arctic to meet global energy demands, there is 
increased recognition of the need to advance upstream impact assessment and decision-making 
to plan for energy development prior to ramping-up individual energy projects (see Doelle et al. 
2012; Elvin and Fraser 2012; Arctic Council 2009; WWF 2005).  However, as Ketilson (2011) 
explains, both industry and government remain sceptical about SEA offshore, noting its 
‘unproven benefits.’  
This paper examines international experiences with SEA in the offshore oil and gas 
sector and the lessons emerging from practice.  Based on SEA offshore in Norway, Atlantic 
Canada and the United Kingdom (UK), the objective is to identify common lessons and 
opportunities to advance the efficacy of SEA as a means to influence offshore hydrocarbon 
planning and development decisions.  The term ‘SEA’ is used to be inclusive of both legislated 
and informal SEA, including regional EAs and both single and multi-sector strategic planning 
and assessment frameworks.  In the sections that follow, SEA is introduced in three international 
offshore systems, followed by an analysis of SEA practice and its influence on offshore oil and 
gas development decisions.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons emerging and 
the implications for advancing SEA for offshore planning and assessment.  
 
2.2 International Systems of SEA Offshore 
Three internationally recognized cases that are distinct in both the nature and context in which 
SEA operates in the offshore environment were identified: Norway, Atlantic Canada and the UK.  
In doing so, the aim was to derive common lessons and challenges that may transcend regional 
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context. Norway’s offshore system provides a circumpolar context, focused on an integrated 
regional planning model; Atlantic Canada is sector-based, with SEA operating under a non-
legislated federal directive; the UK offshore sector is mature, with SEA legislated under the EU 
Directive (2001/42/EC). Environmental assessment offshore in each of the three jurisdictions is 
well documented.  For example, Hasle et al. (2009), Ottersen et al. (2011), and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD 2009) detail Norway’s offshore regulatory framework. In Atlantic 
Canada and the UK, the offshore system and associated EA and licensing regulations are 
described on the respective websites of the responsible authorities, including the Canada-
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) in Atlantic Canada (see 
http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/), and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in the 
UK (see http://offshore-sea.org.uk).  Below a brief overview of each regulatory system is 
provided so as to offer context before presenting the analysis of SEA and its role and influence in 
each of the offshore regions. 
 
2.2.1 Offshore Norway 
Norway’s offshore oil and gas reserves are beneath the North, Norwegian and Barents seas. 
Before offshore areas are made available for licensing preliminary EAs, and in some cases 
regional EAs (REAs), are carried out by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.  Regional EAs 
were introduced under the Petroleum Act in 1997 in an effort to move away from piecemeal 
assessment and obtain timelier, efficient, and comprehensive assessment results (Salter and Ford 
2001; Kinn 1999).  Regional EAs have been completed in both the North Sea and Norwegian 
Sea.  Companies proposing to operate in an offshore area also required to conduct a Plan for 
Development and Operation (PDO), which includes a site specific EA (see Bjørnbom et al. 
2010).  In 2006, Norwegian Parliament introduced an additional framework, an Integrated 
Management Plan (IMP), to capture all sectors in the offshore environment including oil and gas, 
fisheries, and shipping.  Introduced first to the Barents Sea, similar plans for the Norwegian Sea 
commenced in 2009, with an IMP for the North Sea in the development phase (NPD 2009).  
Several sector-specific assessments in the Barents Sea were completed between 2002 and 2005, 
led by the relevant ministries responsible for oil and gas, shipping, and fisheries.  Aggregate 
results have been used to inform IMP development by assessing total impact, identifying 
knowledge gaps and conflict areas, and establishing ecosystem-based management for existing 
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and new activities in the region.  The Goliat project, discovered in 2000, approximately 50 km 
southeast of Snøhvit, was the first oil development project approved in the Barents Sea in the 
area subject to the IMP.  
 
2.2.2 Offshore Atlantic Canada 
In Atlantic Canada, oil and gas activity occurs offshore the provinces of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and Nova Scotia.  An independent joint federal-provincial petroleum board has been 
established in each province to manage hydrocarbon activity.  The C-NLOPB, for example, is 
responsible for oil and gas activity offshore Newfoundland and Labrador and reports to both the 
federal and provincial governments.  Offshore petroleum activities that require authorization by 
the C-NLOPB are also subject to EA pursuant to the federal Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act.  For proposed petroleum exploration and production, the C-NLOPB is 
designated as the federal authority and typically the lead responsible authority for EA 
authorization.  In 2002, the C-NLOPB adopted a policy decision to start conducting SEAs to 
assess offshore regions prior to opening areas for development.  This policy decision eventually 
became a requirement under the federal Cabinet Directive on SEA.  The objectives of SEA under 
the C-NLOPB are to inform licensing in prospective offshore areas and to help streamline issues 
and considerations for subsequent project EAs.  To date, six SEAs have been completed by the 
C-NLOPB, but the three major production facilities currently operating offshore Newfoundland 
and Labrador all exist in a ‘non-SEA’ region.  
 
2.2.3 Offshore United Kingdom 
The DECC is the principal regulator of the offshore oil and gas industry in the UK. In 1999, in 
anticipation of the EU Directive (2001/42/EC), the then Department of Trade and Industry 
instituted SEA as part of the offshore licensing process to determine which areas should be 
offered for licensing.  Although SEA was only incorporated into law through the Directive in 
2004, it was being carried out offshore through less formal arrangements.  The intent of the 
Directive (Article 1) is to “provide for a high level of protection of the environment and to 
contribute to the integration of environmental considerations into the preparation and adoption of 
plans and programmes...” including offshore oil and gas plans and programs.  Licensing for oil 
and gas offshore UK is based on quadrants; there are eight in total, each with a corresponding 
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SEA.  At the project tier, an environmental study must still be carried out for developments to 
assess the likely impacts of proposed offshore activity, which is then submitted to the DECC for 
authorization.  The Laggan-Tormore project is one such example of a recently sanctioned 
offshore gas project in the area of SEA 4 and 5, approximately 140 km northwest of the Shetland 
Islands.  The project will involve construction of an offshore subsea production system, more 
than 140 km of pipeline, and an onshore gas terminal (see http://www.laggan-tormore.com/).  
 
2.3 Examining International Practice 
Following the lead of previous reviews of SEA (see Noble 2009; Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005; 
Jones et al. 2005), each offshore system was reviewed based on a set of normative criteria 
derived from the SEA evaluation literature (see Gunn and Noble 2011; Noble, 2009; Fischer and 
Gazzola 2006; Gibson et al. 2005; Jones et al. 2005) (Table 2-1).  There is no universal set of 
criteria that is equally applicable to all SEAs (Partidário 2000; Fischer 2002); however, adopting 
a normative approach does provide a common framework to analyze SEA practices across 
different contexts (Noble 2009).  This was important to the study as the focus was on identifying 
common lessons, opportunities and constraints that may transcend regional or regulatory context.  
The list of criteria was simplified in comparison to many of the above mentioned reviews of SEA 
performance.  The objective was not to ‘score and compare’ performance across the three 
international SEA offshore systems per se; rather, the objective was to examine the nature and 
efficacy of SEA as a means to influence offshore planning and development decisions and to 
identify and explain common opportunities and constraints across the three cases. 
The three systems were reviewed using regulations and impact assessment and planning 
reports, complemented by semi-structured interviews.  A total of 45 practitioners, regulators, 
industry representatives, and environmental and other non-government organizations (NGOs) 
directly involved in SEA offshore in the respective regions were contacted for an interview. A 
total of 20 interviews were conducted: 9 in Norway, 7 in Atlantic Canada, and 4 in the UK.  No 
UK regulators were willing to participate, thus potentially influencing the nature of the results in 
the UK context.  Continued efforts to secure UK regulator participation also influenced the 
response rate: of the 25 non-respondents, 10 were UK regulators.  The balance was industry and 
environmental and other non-government organizations distributed equally across the three 
cases.  All participants were asked a series of semi-structured questions based on the criteria 
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identified in Table 2-1.  In each jurisdiction an offshore development project was identified to 
examine how SEA had influenced offshore activities at an operational level, and to understand 
better the specific regulatory system.  Interview results were organized, coded thematically and 
analyzed using QSR NVivo© v.9, a computer software program designed to classify and manage 
qualitative information.  Results are presented in the sections below on the basis of each 
criterion. 
 
Table 2-1.  Criteria for International Reviews of SEA Offshore 
Criteria  Description 
Structural Requirements Institutional Foundation for SEA 
1. Objectives and purpose ! Clear provisions or requirements to undertake SEA; clear 
purposes and objectives  
Procedure  
 
Process components concerning the various methodological and 
process elements of SEA, i.e. the practice 
2. Timing ! Early enough to address deliberations on purposes and guide 
initial review of plans, policies or programs 
3. Participation ! Opportunity for meaningful participation and deliberations; 
ability to influence decision-making 
4. Tiering and coordination ! Assessment undertaken within a tiered system of EA, planning 
and decision-making; defined linkages between subsequent 
activities  
5. Alternatives ! Comparative evaluation of potentially reasonable alternatives or 
scenarios 
6. Cumulative effects ! Consideration of cumulative effects 
Output and Results Influence SEA has on decision-making and project-based EA, 
including learning and process improvement 
7. System-wide learning ! Opportunity for learning and system improvement through 
review framework; monitoring and adaptation; cyclical feedback 
8. Influence on decision-making ! Demonstrate influence to downstream initiatives and activities 
 
 
2.3.1 SEA Objectives and Purpose 
Norway’s multi-sectoral IMP is intended to provide a sustainability framework to ensure the co-
existence of different industries within an offshore area.  All interviewees said that the objectives 
and role of the IMP process offshore were clear.  As described by one government participant, 
offshore energy planning and assessment represents “two kinds of systems coming together – the 
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IMP is strategic in nature, providing authorities with a holistic framework to base decisions on, 
whereas the regional EAs are spatially organized, and informed, in part, by the management 
plan.”  
In the case of Atlantic Canada, SEA is undertaken at the program level under the 
authority of the C-NLOPB prior to issuing bids for exploration.  One NGO participant described 
SEA offshore as a “complicated process to navigate,” but in terms of the mandate and structure 
of SEA “the drivers are clear.”  An industry participant similarly noted that the objectives of 
SEA are well defined, but cautioned that “those in the public domain may not fully appreciate 
the process or understand its benefits.”  As one regulator explained, SEA offshore is different in 
depth and content to those performed at the federal level under the Cabinet Directive, which 
were described as “policy instruments.”  SEA offshore was said to not fully conform to the view 
of SEA under the Cabinet Directive; not fitting “the pure SEA definition,” but reflecting the C-
NLOPB’s function as an oil and gas regulator who makes decisions on the issuance of licences 
rather than policy options.  
Though in the UK the mandate and purpose for SEA are laid out in legislation, one SEA 
consultant explained that “there is some flexibility in terms of objectives; you can approach it 
from a mechanistic manner, or set the objective of ensuring the plan or program being assessed 
does not link to environmental degradation.”  There is a prescribed mandate and regulations to 
guide SEA, but one academic participant noted “it is just a long approval process, and the higher 
level components get lost.”  This is consistent with the views of an industry participant who, 
based on direct involvement with the DECC for offshore licensing and environmental permitting, 
said that the experience was such that “SEA’s intent is unclear and expectations on what it will 
deliver, nominal.”  Another academic participant summed-up, when it comes to the purpose and 
mandate of SEA at the level at which decisions are made about specific developments, “SEA is 
not as significant a tool as you think.”  
 
2.3.2 Timing 
Industry characterized Norway’s IMP as allowing regulators to ask, early on, “do we know 
enough, do we have enough knowledge in these areas to approve further activity?”  One industry 
participant identified the IMP as a valuable process to collect information to aid with early 
decision-making concerning a policy, plan or program.  A regulator explained that the process is 
26 !
about determining how to move forward and, in the context of offshore hydrocarbon 
development, to determine where future leasing could occur.  The participant went on to explain 
that timing was much different between the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea, as much petroleum 
activity has already occurred in the Norwegian Sea, adding that “the IMP does not have the same 
function in the Norwegian Sea as the Barents Sea when it comes to creating a framework and 
conditions for planning.”  The Barents Sea IMP occurred early enough to provide substantial 
input and informed policy and subsequent programs and, as a result set out stringent 
environmental requirements for projects such as the Goliat development (see Knol 2011).  
Informing offshore planning and the issuance of rights was identified as one of the major 
intents and benefits of SEA offshore Atlantic Canada. SEAs are initiated only in areas where no 
offshore oil and gas operations currently exist.  As such, SEA is intended to establish a baseline 
condition for a potential licensing area and the results used by the C-NLOPB for licensing 
decisions and, in principle, by industry to augment their baseline assessment in subsequent 
project EAs.  In practice, however, whether this early baseline assessment is useful to project EA 
is unknown.  There are no projects operating in SEA areas. In the Jeanne d’Arc Basin, for 
example, Canada’s most active offshore oil field, there are several operating projects but without 
the guidance of SEA.  Projects in the area have already been subject to federal EA, and industry 
and regulators alike noted that there existed a sufficient information base.  As one industry 
participant explained, we are “unsure if a SEA could create a greater understanding of new 
issues.” 
Under the UK system, SEA is intended to inform decisions being taken about a plan or 
program – whether to proceed, modify it, or abandon it altogether.  One consultant explained that 
SEAs occur sufficiently early, illustrating that “there are instances where we recommend holding 
off on blocks to offer.”  An industry participant, however, currently operating in SEA areas 4 and 
5, noted that if the SEA was not complete before the Laggan-Tormore project it would have not 
made an operational difference, since studies performed for the project would have been derived 
from source data regardless.  Evidently, in this case, a license had already been granted to the 
proponent in an earlier round.  The mature nature of UK offshore sector means that SEA is used 
to inform decisions for subsequent licensing rounds, but frequently in areas where activity 
already exists and licenses are already let. 
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2.3.3 Participation 
Industry described Norway’s IMP process as “an effective approach to bring aboard 
stakeholders,” while “complying with principles of democracy and stakeholder engagement.”  
The consultation process for offshore development has evolved since the first IMP, after industry 
“criticized authorities that the consultations performed were not as open as the ones the oil and 
gas industry had to follow in EA.”  The process was modified with a stronger emphasis on 
engagement and, in 2006, a working group with representatives from relevant authorities, sectors 
and research institutions was established to facilitate more direct communication between 
stakeholders (OSPAR 2010).  This level of IMP engagement and consultation, however, does not 
eliminate conflict over project developments.  The Goliat project, for example, was subject to 
significant controversy (see Bjørnbom et al. 2010) due to it being the first oil project scheduled 
for the Barents Sea.  But, the proponent identified considerable value from the IMP, particularly 
during project consultations, because there was an opportunity to demonstrate how project 
design and mitigation measures were linked to strategic government-led plans and policies.  
In Atlantic Canada, a regulator explained that “the absence of SEA was the ‘hole’ in the 
regulatory process prior – there were mechanisms for participation in project-EA, but the 
licenses have already been issued.”  A C-NLOPB participant further noted that it just “makes 
sense as an initial engagement measure...to be involved in the SEA to get in on the ground to 
help inform what might come later.”  In the case of the Labrador Shelf SEA (Sikiumuit 
Environmental Management 2008), for example, the local Nunatsiavut Aboriginal government 
jointly determined with the C-NLOPB what mitigation measures and restrictions should be 
applied within the offshore area for future developments.  SEA provided an opportunity for 
stakeholders to contribute early in offshore planning and assessment.  However, because the 
focus was at the pre-licensing stage, there was limited industry involvement.  A C-NLOPB 
participant noted “industry has on rare occasions provided comments to SEAs, through the 
public process, but have tended not to be represented...and instead have been interested 
bystanders from a SEA front.” 
Under the UK system, the Directive requires public consultation – emphasizing 
consultation with inter-alia, environmental authorities and public participants.  Consultation 
meetings are open to all public, and when a SEA report is released public notifications are 
issued.  However, an industry participant maintained that those who show up to meetings and 
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provide input, particularly at the SEA scoping stage, are typically government departments, 
advisors, and environmental interest groups.  One academic participant explained that engaging 
with the public becomes more difficult as development moves offshore, maintaining that this 
challenge “seems to be as a result of impacts being less direct and tangible at an individual 
level.”  Further, the scope of SEA offshore is limited to plans and programs, which may reduce 
the capacity to publically debate policy alternatives (see Bina 2008b).  As a result, one academic 
participant suggested that the public view of SEA is one of a formality and a process conducted 
in support of offshore development.  
 
2.3.4 Tiering and Coordination 
Norway’s IMP was described by a government participant as providing “the big picture” of 
where activity can occur and what conditions must be placed on petroleum development (e.g., 
discharge, drilling, and exploration restrictions), which are enforced by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy.  Companies then perform a detailed EA, referring back to the IMP 
conditions.  Before amendments to the Petroleum Act (1997), PDO applications and EAs were 
prepared on an individual project basis, receiving much criticism from industry due to the 
duplication of work for companies, resulting also in narrowly scoped and redundant EAs.  That 
said, the Barents Sea IMP is not tiered toward individual field developments and is not necessary 
for the approval of new developments; it focuses holistically on all activities, and not specific 
offshore oil and gas development operations.  In the Norwegian Sea, REAs fulfill a similar role 
to help guide project activities and avoid duplication and redundancy of assessments, but are 
tiered specifically toward offshore petroleum activities.  As such, there has emerged new debate 
as to whether there should be two regional-type impact assessments for all offshore regions, with 
one geared specifically toward petroleum activities.  
In Atlantic Canada, tiering can only be described in terms of intent, as no projects are 
operating in areas where SEAs have been completed.  One regulator contended that SEAs tend to 
focus on sensitive areas, noting that not only is that important information for the C-NLOPB but 
also “from a procedural fairness point of view, it describes the sensitivities in the wider area for 
any company that wants to bid on a parcel.”  The C-NLOPB’s perspective on tiering is related to 
its purpose for conducting SEA, being an early assessment that can inform subsequent permitting 
and the issuance of licences.  Using seismic surveying as an example, if there are ecologically 
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sensitive areas identified through SEA, the intent is that an EA would focus in detail on these 
areas as opposed to focusing on areas that may not be regionally significant.  A consultant to 
industry noted that SEA could be used as a reference document for industry, adding that “it is a 
lot easier for industry to use a SEA rather than having to go back to all the original sources to 
locate information,” but at the same time cautioned that from a project permitting perspective 
“SEA is not an exhaustive compendium.”  One NGO participant similarly described SEA as a 
potential “guide for further activities,” but noted that this can also be detrimental from a 
socioeconomic perspective in that the current absence of socioeconomic considerations at the 
strategic tier can carry forward to the project tier. 
SEA at the licensing stage offshore UK is well defined in respect to regulatory 
requirements to ensure potential environmental implications of proposed activities are properly 
assessed prior to consent and permits being granted (see Thérivel and Walsh 2006).  In practice, 
however, the application of SEA to inform regulatory licensing decisions has been relatively 
limited and static to this higher tier, with seemingly trivial input to subsequent lower level 
assessments.  From the perspective of one operator, the two SEAs in which the Laggan-Tormore 
project exists had “no implication or influence on the project or EA.”  Another industry 
participant noted that the only way the SEA linked to an offshore project “was as a reference 
document,” adding that, even with nine years of experience in the UK offshore oil and gas 
industry, (s)he was “unsure how SEA is used by regulators…”  
 
2.3.5 Alternatives 
Alternative scenarios were not explicitly identified in Norway’s IMP; however, action thresholds 
in environmental monitoring programs were present to inform future scenario planning 
(Massachusetts Ocean Partnership 2009).  The IMP process was based on multiple sector-based 
EAs to produce a regional picture of existing impacts, intended to inform management plans and 
courses of action for future development.  In principle, the concept of alternatives evaluation is 
inherent to the IMP as the process is focused on preferable options for development and 
conservation in the region, including the consideration of future changes or threats to planning, 
such as climate change. 
In Atlantic Canada, the Labrador Shelf Offshore Area SEA contains in its objectives and 
purpose statement reference to the importance of alternatives in SEA, citing Thérivel et al. 
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(1992); however, the alternatives considered in the SEA are inherently restrictive as the C-
NLOPB makes decisions only as to issue licences or not, and does not address broader policy 
scenarios or offshore development trajectories.  One regulator explained that though SEA would 
conventionally address broad alternatives, the C-NLOPB is “an offshore oil and gas regulatory 
body, so the only decision we are making, subject to government sanction, is whether or not to 
issue licences, versus the broader energy questions.”  ‘Alternative means’ are identified in 
offshore SEAs that relate to licence issuing decisions and the potential implications of licensing, 
including such matters as seismic versus exploratory drilling, conditions on the location and 
timing of activities and, in the Labrador Shelf SEA, hypothetical development situations and 
potential outcomes.  
Alternatives are considered in UK SEA, as a requirement of the Directive and prescribed 
in regulation.  In practice, however, one consultant explained that “they are generally a simplistic 
set of alternatives,” which commonly include to carry forward the draft plan as proposed; to not 
proceed with the plan; or to modify the plan with spatial or temporal restrictions.  Feedback from 
NGOs has targeted the restrictive nature of alternatives, and the need to consider broader 
alternatives, such as more efficient energy options.  However, similar to Atlantic Canada, these 
policy issues are beyond the mandate of the offshore regulator, and are outside the scope of the 
specific tier at which SEA is applied.  The omission of policies from the scope of the EU’s SEA 
Directive is thought to be a serious deficiency by some (Fischer et al. 2002, cited in Jay 2010); 
however, others, including a consultant who was directly involved with SEAs 1-8, said that SEA 
documents would “become enormous and mechanistic” and would not be as effective if a policy 
direction was added to decisions.  
 
2.3.6 Cumulative Effects 
The various uses of Norway’s offshore regions and its resources have traditionally been assessed 
and managed separately (Ottersen et al. 2011).  Under the IMP, there emerged an opportunity to 
better understand the cumulative effects of the activities of different sectors in the offshore 
region, and to better assess the effects of new activities and the ability of ecosystems to adapt and 
respond to change (OSPAR 2010).  During the Barents Sea IMP review, however, challenges 
arose in the evaluation of cumulative effects as the scale applied to evaluate impacts and enable 
cross-sector cumulative effects assessment (CEA) turned out to be of little practical value.  This 
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was due to the different intents and values imposed by each sector when performing their 
assessments (Ottersen et al. 2011), and the lack of coordination of common variables and 
indicators to measure cumulative change.  
In Atlantic Canada, CEA does not formally occur until the project EA tier. A consultant 
to industry acknowledged that it would be “worthwhile if SEA went one step further and did a 
CEA, it would help streamline the process...rather than each project taking it upon themselves.” 
Interestingly, however, a NGO participant advocated against a more regional approach to CEA 
maintaining that such an approach is not valuable or practical “unless you have a specific 
proposed activity in an area and determine what you need to look at.”  This participant viewed 
the regional concept of CEA under SEA as too broad, adding that SEAs, when dealing with 
cumulative effects, never identify a specific activity (e.g., seismic drilling), and without these 
parameters to inform models and monitoring it remains unclear what cumulative effects are 
being assessed.  An industry participant agreed, adding that “the accuracy of cumulative effects 
is one thing that varies at the SEA level, but is spoken to more adequately at project level EA.”  
Offshore UK, SEA Directive 2001/42/EC does provide an opportunity to address 
cumulative effects at the strategic level.  The Directive requires the consideration of “likely 
significant effects ...including cumulative and synergistic effects...”  In principle, the UK 
approach provides a regional context and opportunity to assess the cumulative significance of 
activities as an integral part of the SEA process (see Cooper 2004).  In the offshore environment, 
however, one consultant commented that CEA is considerably difficult because there are a lot of 
unknowns, and went on to explain that at the strategic tier you “can conjecture cumulative 
impacts as best you can; at the project level, you can consider specifics, but when you extend to 
national or regional level it is a challenge, an imperfect science.” 
 
2.3.7 System-wide Learning 
Both government and industry participants indicated that Norway’s IMP has helped inform the 
public and alleviate misperception about oil and gas industry impacts to the marine environment, 
and that a significant amount of learning has occurred as a result of actors sharing expertise and 
knowledge.  One consultant considered learning a defining feature of the IMP, with an 
opportunity to revisit policy through regulator-based performance monitoring and the 
deployment of new assessments every five years.  Ongoing marine research and mapping efforts 
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to identify data gaps and integrate new data on long-term effects with risk assessment tools was 
identified as core to ongoing IMP improvement.  Described by Knol (2010: 8) as a “learning 
process,” the IMP incorporates ongoing and ex post evaluation through adaptive management 
strategies in environmental monitoring programs, and the sharing of information between sectors 
and through the inclusion of external scientific advisory committees (see Massachusetts Ocean 
Partnership 2009).  A participant from Norway's offshore industry noted that one of the most 
important elements resulting from the IMP in recent years has been that each industry is treated 
equally and there is now an ability to apply similar assessment methods across sectors to identify 
impacts to the offshore environment. 
System learning and improvements in Atlantic Canada have occurred through increased 
efforts to engage the public and interest groups, and were identified by the C-NLOPB as 
important to the evolution of SEA.  The first two offshore SEAs conducted, for example, were 
performed with limited engagement of the public.  The C-NLOPB recognized the need and value 
to ensure a more objective and participatory analysis and created working groups, with external 
stakeholder representation, to contribute to scoping and technical reviews.  Multiple participants 
concurred that by involving interested or affected actors the SEA process has been enhanced and 
better informed as decision-making is now subject to greater deliberation.  Improved 
participation was said to have led to the inclusion and consideration of new information raised 
through dialogue between regulators and fishers who have specific local knowledge of the 
marine environment.  Others noted improvements in the spatial boundaries of SEAs.  Based on 
lessons from the first SEA in the Laurentian sub-basin, a C-NLOPB participant explained that 
the spatial boundary was too small and did not align with SEA’s intent.  The C-NLOPB 
subsequently broadened the areas of its offshore SEAs to avoid “creating patchwork 
assessments.”  
Similar learning was identified by UK participants.  The UK’s first offshore SEA, for 
example, was limited in opportunity for public input – it was described by one consultant as an 
“internal exercise.”  Comparable to Atlantic Canada, subsequent SEAs have evolved to include 
more opportunities for participation (see ODPM 2005).  The creation of a steering group, noted 
one consultant, “has helped draw in a fairly wide range of stakeholders with interest in the area.”  
Feedback through monitoring and evaluation was also identified as an important opportunity to 
provide information that can be used to identify specific performance issues, and inform 
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subsequent decision actions.  The Directive itself was also reported to have modified certain 
aspects of SEA practice, with more tailored requirements, specifically adding indicators to 
objectives to establish stronger links with monitoring and the evaluation of predicted effects.  
Similar to Atlantic Canada, however, socioeconomic assessment was identified as an area where 
little learning and improvement seems to have occurred.  One consultant noted that SEA could 
“fulfil the Directive without going into socioeconomic impacts.”  
 
2.3.8 Influence on Decision-making 
The IMP approach offshore Norway helped authorities create an intra-directorate plan to inform 
future development.  Based on the IMP’s results, measures and requirements to prevent and 
reduce negative impacts have influenced decisions made by the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, such as restrictions or conditions for industry operations.  In the case of the Goliat 
project, for example, an industry participant maintained that the IMP and requirements from 
authorities have made it easier to focus on project-specific issues and has heightened the need to 
take a precautionary approach to operations.  For industry, an important outcome of the IMP has 
been continuous research and development to find technical solutions that are economically 
feasible to comply with strict environmental regulation (see Hasle et al. 2009).  Already, industry 
has started collecting information requested in the IMP’s environmental baseline and monitoring 
programs to help address knowledge gaps.  Other industry proponents perceived the IMP as 
having a positive influence on project operations, indicating that regulatory authorities have a 
better basis for decisions, which leads to greater predictability for industry.  Coordination 
between REA and project EA in the Norwegian and North seas were reported to have also 
resulted in improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall review process (see 
Hasle et al. 2009; Kinn 1999).  
In Atlantic Canada, SEA has enabled early-stage decision-making for offshore regulators.  
For proponents, SEA is promoted as supporting investment decisions, and providing a reference 
point for baseline knowledge.  For example, through the identification of sensitive fish spawning 
areas in an SEA, requirements would be set for project-specific EAs concerning the timing and 
location of drilling operations.  The Orphan Basin SEA (LGL 2003) findings, for example, 
demonstrate how SEA was designed to inform prospective activity in the study region, whereby 
special, non-standard or strict mitigation measures have been identified to be applied to future 
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developments because of the need for special planning around sensitive marine habitats.  Based 
on the views of participants, SEA in Atlantic Canada, at least in principle, offers a valuable 
framework to inform downstream planning and mitigation activity; however, the demonstrated 
influence could not be verified in absence of offshore operations in the SEA areas.  
Under the UK system, SEA assists responsible authorities to determine what areas may 
be subject to activity (i.e., exploration licensing), and places certain spatial or temporal 
conditions upon activities in those areas.  One consultant explained that SEA has “undoubtedly 
had an influence upon offshore oil and gas decision-making,” referencing the identification of 
exclusion areas when blocks are determined inappropriate for petroleum development.  The 
downstream influence of SEA on project EA, however, appears weak with real SEA influence 
restricted largely to higher level decision-making.  The decisions made by responsible authorities 
have some bearing on offshore operations; however, this influence was not apparent at the 
operational level given industry participants’ experience and view that “SEA has had no 
influence on planning or project-based EA.”  Industry participants maintained that there is no 
expectation of what SEA is expected to deliver, and “unless the project is going against the SEA 
report, then SEA has no real influence on decision-making.”  This disconnect was further 
compounded by a view held by one academic participant, “that developers and consultants have 
not caught on to the idea or notion of strategic,” and industry’s viewpoint that the “system in 
place for offshore oil and gas regulation is spread thin on government capacity terms, which 
impedes implementation and operations.”  The most obvious limitation identified was the lack of 
a tiered system and decision-making that carried forward to lower level EAs, owing perhaps to a 
range of interlinked factors, including: the DECC is said to be doing a poor job of 
communicating the purpose of SEA; operators are said to be missing the potential value and 
application of SEA; and SEA is understood to be confined to strategic planning decisions.  
 
2.4 Lessons and Implications for Advancing SEA Offshore  
The goal of this paper was not to ‘test’ the performance of SEA offshore across jurisdictions, as 
the institutional context of SEA varies considerably (see Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir 
2007).  Rather, the goal was to facilitate a better understanding about the roles and constraints of 
SEA in the offshore sector, and to identify common lessons, challenges, and opportunities that 
may transcend context in order to advance SEA as a tool for the planning and development of 
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offshore oil and gas.  In the sections that follow a number of observations and lessons concerning 
the general practice of SEA in offshore environments that emerged from the three cases are 
discussed.  
 
2.4.1 Normative versus Applied SEA 
First, the purpose and deliverables of SEA in the offshore environment often differ from the 
ambitious expectations about SEA identified in the academic literature, and by project 
proponents and other stakeholders.  In the UK, for example, SEA offshore is restricted to the 
higher tier of identifying areas for licensing.  Though requirements for SEA are set out in 
regulation, industry still perceived a lack of clarity as to the purpose of SEA and how it informed 
or improved decisions at the project level.  In Atlantic Canada, the regulator’s view and 
application of SEA as a tool for licensing decisions was in contrast to the academic view of SEA, 
and also in contrast to SEA as described under the Canadian federal SEA directive.  Such 
differences lead to false expectations about what SEA is intended to deliver offshore, and to 
whom, and dismay with the overall process.  
The results suggest that what SEA can and should deliver in the context of the offshore 
oil and gas sector may not be consistent with the expectations of SEA that have been developed 
based largely on land use planning and ‘on-shore’ policy and good-practice frameworks.  The 
objectives, constraints, and intent of SEA in the offshore sector need to be made clear for all 
interested parties if the results of the process are to be a demonstrated, accepted and worthwhile 
part of planning and development (see Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005).  For emerging offshore 
energy frontiers, such as Canada’s western Arctic, there is a need to clearly establish the scope 
and intent of SEA prior to ramping-up individual energy projects.  In this way, the relationship 
between strategic approaches and the intended contribution to project-based actions can be 
articulated at the outset.  The pre-existence of project operations, EA and prior licensing 
approvals in Atlantic Canada and the UK appeared to be a constraint to stakeholder’s 
understanding of the actual role and added benefits of SEA. 
 
2.4.2 Timing, Role and Influence 
Related to the above, the benefits of SEA in the offshore environment hinge not only on 
connecting results to operational decisions and activities, but also on ensuring that SEA is 
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conducted early enough to effect change and influence development actions (see Harriman Gunn 
and Noble 2009b).  Though in each of the cases reviewed the timing of SEA was, in part, 
dependent on the regulatory context and purpose of the assessment, timing proved to be critical 
in all three cases in ensuring how much influence SEA actually had on downstream decisions.  In 
the Barents Sea, for example, where petroleum activity was the main driver for the IMP, early 
application allowed authorities to measure existing impacts and identify sensitive areas to inform 
future planning and decision-making in a relatively untouched, yet politically contested and 
ecologically sensitive region.  Alternatively, in the UK, where several project developments had 
preceded SEA, the merit of its application appeared weaker due to the lack of input to on-going 
operations.  In certain areas offshore Atlantic Canada, namely the Jeanne d’Arc Basin, SEAs 
have not been conducted specifically because projects have already been initiated and SEA was 
seen as adding little value in such circumstances.  
Though early application is best, before licenses are issued, that there is still merit to SEA 
coming late in the offshore planning and development process – where licenses or projects 
already exist.  Ketilson (2011) reports stakeholder concerns in Canada’s western Arctic that once 
rights are issued, the window of opportunity for SEA has closed.  Evidently SEA late in the 
decision process is less influential in setting strategic direction; however, SEA post-rights 
issuance or post-project approval is important to both industry and regulators for regional 
monitoring and feedback for improved project performance, risk management, assessing the 
potential cumulative impacts of future development, and determining the need for policy or 
planning intervention to adjust the current development trajectory.  
 
2.4.3 Alternatives Consideration versus Mandate 
Alternative assessment is identified as core to SEA (see Fischer 2007; Noble and Storey 2001) 
however, the nature of alternatives considered in each of the three systems examined was 
inherently restrictive when compared to the academic expectation, but was consistent with the 
context and intended purposes of SEA in each offshore system.  In the UK and Atlantic Canada, 
for example, the degree to which alternatives could reasonably be considered was constrained by 
the tier of application at the plan or program level, the regulator’s mandate of issuing rights, and 
the level of pre-existing offshore development.  Those alternatives that were considered were 
limited to the same types of alternatives often considered at the project tier.  The absence of 
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broader policy-level alternatives was a noted deficiency in the SEA process.  However, others 
argued that incorporating policy into SEA offshore may sound reasonable in principle, but in 
practice would be overly ambitious and regulators, who are responsible largely for rights 
issuance, have neither the mandate nor capacity to undertake such a broad assessment.  
 
2.4.4 Participation, Interest and Influence 
Each jurisdiction recognized the importance of public participation, reinforcing SEA’s 
communicative potential as a means to influence decisions (see Runhaar and Driessen 2007).  
The nature of engagement, however, varied considerably. Participation in SEA is often promoted 
as providing greater opportunity for stakeholders to inform the direction of decisions about 
development (see Sinclair et al. 2009).  As evidenced by local Aboriginal engagement in setting 
mitigation standards for the Labrador Shelf SEA, Atlantic Canada, even at the strategic tier local 
communities can influence decision outcomes.  The case of the Goliat project in the Barents Sea 
illustrated an additional, but indirect benefit of participation with observable benefits accruing to 
a project proponent.  Here, public engagement in the IMP at the strategic tier provided a 
knowledge base for stakeholders such that the proponent was able to demonstrate to the public, 
at the project tier, the consistency of project mitigation actions with higher level IMP goals and 
priorities.  The result was increased efficiencies in EA for the proponent.  In the UK, however, 
there has been much less direct public engagement, confirming Sinclair and Diduck’s (2009) 
observation that the lack of participation at the strategic level can result in cynicism and a 
perception that decisions are foregone conclusions.  
The challenge for SEA reflects what Heiland (2007) describes as the participation 
paradox – there is, in principle, greater opportunity for engagement and influence at the strategic 
tier, but often less interest in engagement due to the high level and, often abstract nature of 
decisions.  This challenge is exacerbated in the offshore context, where biophysical impacts are 
often geographically removed from the public and traditionally deemed ‘out-of-sight, out-of-
mind.’  Recent media attention to Arctic energy exploration and to the risks of offshore 
development following the Gulf of Mexico spill event may heighten, at least in the short term, 
public interest; however, over the long term, ensuring meaningful participation in SEA offshore 
will require a much more concerted effort on behalf of regulators than what has traditionally 
been the case.  Early and meaningful participation is needed to determine the acceptable level of 
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public risk associated with the development of offshore hydrocarbon resources, and to prepare 
communities for the potential onshore socioeconomic impacts of development.  
 
2.4.5 SEA Offshore for Onshore Impacts 
Socioeconomic issues received relatively limited attention in each of the three offshore systems 
reviewed.  Results illustrated that socioeconomic issues, when considered, focused primarily on 
fisheries, presumably as the main pathway of socioeconomic impact.  Notwithstanding 
recognition in the US mid-Atlantic offshore industry in the mid-1970s that onshore communities 
need to be considered part of the planning and assessment process for offshore development (see 
US Office of Technology Assessment 1976), the onshore impacts of offshore development, 
specifically the onshore geography of benefits and risks, is largely absent from offshore SEA 
systems.  For example, directives on SEA can be fulfilled offshore both in Atlantic Canada and 
the UK with only limited attention to socioeconomic issues.  
There is a need and an opportunity for SEA offshore to adopt a much broader approach to 
socioeconomic issues than solely marine resource use conflicts, to contribute to community 
planning in advance of offshore development.  Norman (2005) argues that the well-being of 
coastal communities should be paramount in marine resource decision-making, and there is a 
need to focus on what the socioeconomic implications will be in the region surrounding the most 
prospective basins.  SEA provides a window to integrate socioeconomic considerations early in 
the planning of offshore oil and gas systems (see Noble and Harriman 2008) and, as such, there 
is a need for increased attention in SEA to identifying what “communities…need to be able to do 
and know when confronting the opportunities, threats and challenges of offshore oil and gas” 
(Norman 2005: 108). 
 
2.4.6 Capacity and for Cumulative Effects Assessment Beyond the Sector 
The potential for SEA as a tool to assess cumulative effects is well argued, but the benefits have 
not been clearly demonstrated in offshore practice.  Results reveal that practitioner and regulator 
views of the value of SEA as a tool to assess cumulative effects offshore did not align with 
current academic literature on the subject.  Duinker and Greig (2007), for example, amongst 
others, argue that CEA is ineffective at the project scale and a more regional, strategic approach 
to CEA is necessary.  However, in Atlantic Canada participants argued that the strategic tier is 
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too broad and abstract for CEA, and that the project level, where there is more detail and 
information available concerning actual offshore operations, is the most appropriate tier for 
assessing cumulative effects.  Perhaps the level of offshore activity in Atlantic Canada 
influenced participants’ views on CEA, as many expressed the challenges of taking a regional 
approach to CEA in an area where relatively little activity occurs.  Norway, on the other hand, 
offered a more favourable view of CEA beyond the project tier (see Salter and Ford 2001) - the 
high level of hydrocarbon activity in the Norwegian and North seas has been the subject of 
cumulative effects studies through REA for more than a decade.  However, the multi-sectoral 
nature of early assessments under the higher-tiered IMP proved difficult to coordinate 
cumulative effects understanding.  
The dynamics at play across all three jurisdictions appear to be consistent with Creasy’s 
(2002) view that CEA beyond the project tier is difficult to implement because the agencies 
responsible for development often have neither the authority nor the capacity to address multi-
sectoral cumulative effects.  It can be concluded that the most significant constraints to CEA in 
offshore SEA systems are institutional and methodological rather than scientific and technical 
(see also Noble and Harriman 2008).  Any institution established for SEA offshore must have the 
mandate and the capacity to assess cumulative effects beyond single-sector initiatives, to direct 
regional monitoring programs, and to ensure that SEA outputs are implemented in subsequent 
planning and project actions. 
 
2.4.7 Tiering in Non-Tiered Planning Systems 
Finally, although tiering is considered by many to be a major driver and benefit of SEA (see 
Fischer 2007; João 2005), the tiered forward benefits and influence of SEA were not fully 
realized in all three offshore systems.  When realized, the benefits of the trickle-down approach 
were often subtle, if not indirect.  Interestingly, only Norway’s IMP process demonstrated a 
tiered forward planning system, and notably it was the only system that focused on multiple 
offshore resource activities and is not formally labeled as SEA.  The Norwegian case illustrates 
how SEA can serve to streamline project-specific EA by demonstrating the consistency and 
compliance of a project’s EA with higher-tiered offshore planning and management priorities.  In 
contrast, offshore Atlantic Canada and the UK, though both formal, directive-based SEA 
systems, there was less evidence of tiering and downstream influence.  In both jurisdictions, SEA 
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offshore is sector-specific and largely confined to facilitating strategic decisions about licensing 
offshore areas and, in the case of Atlantic Canada, providing regional baseline information.  
There were some obvious benefits, such as information being applied to assist regulators with 
exploration licensing decision-making and determining whether certain offshore areas, due to 
their ecological sensitivity, are suitable for development.  However, many of the anticipated 
benefits associated with SEA were less apparent.  In the UK, the SEA Directive assumes tiering 
of SEAs and EAs at different planning levels, and Article 3(2) of the Directive requires SEA for 
plans and programs to set the framework for future development and consent of EA projects (see 
Arts et al. 2005).  However, beyond DECC licensing decisions the influence of SEA was less 
evident with seemingly trivial linkages to subsequent lower level assessments.  The UK system, 
although well established under the SEA Directive proved limited in its ability to tier and 
influence decision-making at an operational level.  
The mandate of SEA may simply be too narrow in offshore Atlantic Canada and the UK 
to have the broad influence and benefits often expected of it.  While the true influence and 
efficacy may be tested best through the adaptation of offshore practices based on lessons 
emerging, it was recognized that tiering and influence may not be immediate in all cases and 
results may be long-term and delayed, if not too subtle to measure.  International experiences 
demonstrate that, ultimately, the influence of SEA on subsequent actions and decisions is, to a 
significant extent, a reflection of the nature of inputs and objectives of the SEA process.  It is 
difficult to realize the benefits of tiering in SEA offshore where the underling planning system 
itself is either not tiered or non-existent. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Strategic environmental assessment for offshore oil and gas planning and development is on-
going internationally in select jurisdictions, but the sector has received limited attention in the 
SEA literature.  There have been few empirical studies of SEA processes for the offshore sector, 
and little is known about how SEA influences and improves planning and development.  Based 
on experiences in Norway, Canada, and the UK results demonstrate that SEA offshore is 
following in the footsteps of its predecessor, project-based EA.  Regardless of SEA context, the 
results illustrated limited ability of SEA offshore to operationalize CEA at a regional level; 
limited attention to addressing broader socioeconomic concerns though participation and 
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engagement; a process often too narrowly scoped to generate the benefits often expected of SEA; 
and too little attention to maximizing downstream influence through tiering processes.  Context 
is important to consider when reviewing the nature and efficacy of SEA systems; by applying a 
set of normative criteria the paper’s findings showed that in many respects the limitations to SEA 
offshore are a direct result of context – specific regulatory or capacity constraints on SEA 
systems and on its ability to influence decision processes.  
In conclusion, the assumption that SEA is a solution to the shortcomings of project-based 
EA in the offshore oil and gas sector, and can help inform and improve the efficacy and 
efficiency of project-based assessment, was not consistently supported across all three systems 
reviewed.  International experience suggests that SEA administered in the offshore for strictly 
petroleum licensing, and managed by a single authority, will be inherently restrictive in nature 
and challenge the delivery of influential SEA.  To effectively deliver on the benefits of SEA, and 
to ensure appropriate planning for the onshore impacts of offshore development, a multi-sectoral 
approach is required in the offshore environment, with direct tiering and terms and conditions for 
project-specific developments and regional monitoring programs.  Though there are multiple 
models of SEA for offshore planning and development, a consistent message is that without clear 
coordination between higher and lower tiers, SEA will fail to achieve not only its objective, but 
decisions about offshore development will continue to be made in a restrictive environmental 
and socioeconomic context.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT PLANNING, ASSESSMENT AND 
SCIENCE INITIATIVES IN CANADA’S BEAUFORT SEA 
!
Preface to Chapter 3 
This Chapter addresses the second objective of the thesis, to identify stakeholder perceptions 
regarding challenges and opportunities of current marine planning, assessment and science 
initiatives in Canada’s western Arctic to ascertain whether and how these initiatives enable 
horizontal and vertical integration and effectively facilitate marine resource planning and 
decision-making.  The Chapter has been accepted for publication in Arctic, co-authored by Fidler 
(lead author) and Noble.  !!
Abstract 
Many regional studies and planning initiatives have occurred in the Beaufort Sea over the past 20 
years, and currently three major initiatives are underway – the Integrated Ocean Management 
Plan, the Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment and the Integrated Regional Impact 
Studies, which focus on planning, regional assessment, and science, respectively.  Despite the 
mounting pressures for offshore energy development, there has been limited attention on whether 
these initiatives facilitate a more coordinated and informed approach to planning, assessment and 
decision-making for sustainable offshore development in the region.  This gap is addressed by 
examining stakeholder perceptions of the existing initiatives to ascertain whether and how these 
initiatives enable horizontal and vertical integration, and effectively facilitate marine resource 
planning and decision-making.  Results demonstrate three key issues as essential to a more 
coordinated, regional approach to marine resource planning and management in relation to 
offshore development: horizontal integration between management bodies, vertical tiering from 
the strategic level and regional scale to the operational level and project scale, and establishing 
an overarching vision for regional planning and development in the Beaufort Sea.  !!
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3.1 Introduction 
Planning for and managing the impacts of offshore energy development requires a more 
integrative and anticipatory framework than project- and sector-specific environmental impact 
assessment (Fidler and Noble 2012; Katsanevakis et al. 2011; de Reynier et al. 2010; Crowder 
and Norse 2008).  This is particularly the case in Canada’s western Arctic Beaufort Sea (see 
BSStRPA 2008; IGC 2004), which is characterized by competing interests in hydrocarbon 
development, traditional use and marine conservation (see Cobb et al. 2008; Fast et al. 2005).  
Whether and how Canada plans for and manages the impacts of energy development on its 
Arctic marine environment has important domestic and international implications.  Canada’s 
Beaufort Sea may be considered a testing ground for the country’s overall preparedness to 
manage the impacts of major offshore energy development, and a signal to the rest of the world 
of its interest in the long-term sustainability of Arctic marine resources.  
However, Canada currently lacks an overarching vision and integrated planning and 
assessment framework for development in the western Arctic (see Fidler and Noble 2012; 
Ketilson 2011).  Decisions about offshore development occur largely on a project-by-project 
basis (Voutier et al. 2008).  There have been many regional studies and planning initiatives in 
Canada’s western Arctic over the past thirty years (see CAPP 2009; BSStRPA 2008).  Currently, 
the largest and most significant of these are the Integrated Ocean Management Plan (IOMP), the 
Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment (BREA) and the Integrated Regional Impact 
Studies (IRIS), focused on planning, regional assessment, and science, respectively.  Each 
initiative is distinct in terms of its structure and purpose and may offer tangible benefits to 
support more informed decision-making about future Arctic development.  However, there has 
been limited attention to whether and how they enable horizontal and vertical integration or 
facilitate a more coordinated and informed approach to planning, assessment and decision-
making for sustainable offshore development.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine stakeholder perceptions regarding the challenges 
and opportunities of current marine planning, assessment and science initiatives in Canada’s 
western Arctic.  The intent is not to undertake a comparative evaluation, since each initiative was 
established for a different purpose.  Rather, the objective is to examine whether and how these 
initiatives effectively facilitate marine resource planning, assessment and decision-making in 
light of mounting pressures for offshore energy development.  Each of the IOMP, BREA, and 
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IRIS initiatives is introduced below, followed by an analysis of their individual and collective 
opportunities and constraints.  The paper concludes with lessons emerging from and the 
implications for advancing a more integrated planning and management approach in the Beaufort 
Sea.  
 
3.2 Beaufort Sea Large Ocean Management Area 
The Beaufort Sea Large Ocean Management Area (LOMA) covers over one million km2, 
encompassing the marine portion of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR) (Figure 3-1), and has 
been identified as one of five priority areas for integrated ocean management by the Government 
of Canada (Cobb et al. 2008).  The area contains the Tarium Niryutait Marine Protected Area and 
is rich in biological diversity, including benthic fauna, birds, marine and anadromous fish (e.g., 
arctic cod, arctic char, salmon), terrestrial mammals (e.g., caribou, arctic fox, lynx, arctic hare), 
and marine mammals (e.g., bowhead whales, beluga whales, ringed seal, walrus, polar bear) 
(Loseto et al. 2010; Cobb et al. 2008).  The marine resources of the Beaufort Sea provide 
sustenance and have been part of Inuvialuit fishing and hunting practices for centuries.  
 The Beaufort Sea is also rich in hydrocarbon resources (INAC 2010; Harrison 2006), and 
has been subject to cycles of offshore activity for more than forty years.  Prior to 2007, areas 
open for licensing were restricted to the continental shelf in waters less than 100 m deep, and an 
extensive amount of research has been conducted on the near shore region.  Over the past five 
years exploration licenses have been let in the deep offshore, generating new questions around 
Canada’s preparedness for drilling in frontier regions (Elvin and Fraser 2012; Porta and Bankes 
2011).  Tension regarding the administration of offshore oil and gas is particularly evident in the 
Beaufort, where challenges over development are intensified by safety issues, including 
controversial relief well regulation; risk and benefit debates for those who inhabit the region (see 
Porta and Bankes 2011); and concern regarding long-term ecological impacts and climate change 
(see Burkett 2011; Prowse et al. 2009). 
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Figure 3-1.  Inuvialuit Settlement Region of Canada’s Western Arctic 
Source: Map developed by Michael St. Louis, University of Saskatchewan 
 
 The Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) (1984), a negotiated agreement between the 
Inuvialuit of Canada’s western Arctic and the Government of Canada, provides a framework for 
the co-management of land and marine resources in the ISR; however, the Government of 
Canada retains jurisdiction over and authority to manage Canada’s western Arctic offshore 
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marine environment, including the offshore region of the ISR.  The National Energy Board 
(NEB) and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) have independent, 
but complementary roles in the Beaufort Sea: the NEB authorizes drilling, while AANDC 
administers industry rights for oil exploration.  Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) manages 
development authorizations under the Fisheries Act (1985), and the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (2012) applies to projects whenever a federal authority has a decision-making 
responsibility. 
 
3.3 Current Planning, Assessment and Science Initiatives 
The IOMP emerged within the context of Canada’s Oceans Strategy, released in 2002 to 
facilitate implementation of the Oceans Act (1996).  The IOMP, which identifies DFO as the 
coordinator and facilitator for oceans management, is intended to balance ecological 
conservation with sustainable development through a multi-stakeholder process.  With partners 
from Aboriginal, Territorial and Federal governments, northern residents, ENGOs, and private 
interests, the IOMP aims to guide development planning in a manner that reflects the goals and 
values of those who occupy and have interests in coastal, island, and ocean areas.  It builds on 
the work of previous initiatives including Inuvialuit Community Conservation Plans, the 
Beaufort Sea Strategic Regional Plan of Action, and the Beaufort Sea Integrated Management 
Planning Initiative (Beaufort Sea Partnership 2009).  Having already facilitated an ecological 
assessment of the area and developed a regional governance process to support inter-
departmental and inter-governmental oceans governance processes, the remaining, and perhaps 
most challenging step is to implement the plan and monitor and evaluate outcomes.  
BREA is a multi-stakeholder regional assessment initiative that emerged, in part, as a 
response to the Inuvialuit Game Council’s request to the federal Minister of Environment (IGC 
2004) for a regional assessment of the development of offshore oil and gas resources in the 
Beaufort Sea (see Voutier et al. 2008).  In 2008, the Beaufort Sea Strategic Regional Plan of 
Action (BSStRPA 2008) identified the need for a coordinated and strategic approach to 
environmental assessment in the region (BSStRPA Steering Committee 2008).  The federal 
response was BREA – a four-year, $21.8M CDN research project designed to collect data on 
specific issues related to offshore oil and gas development.  Led by AANDC, the purpose of 
BREA is to ensure that governments, Inuvialuit and industry are better prepared for offshore oil 
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and gas development by identifying and filling gaps in environmental baseline data related to 
offshore activities and the marine environment, and supporting efficient regulatory decision-
making by providing information to all stakeholders for the purpose of project specific 
assessments.  
 IRIS is a science-based program focused on the impacts of climate change in the Arctic.  
Led by ArcticNet, a federal Network of Centres of Excellence Program, the goal of IRIS is to 
integrate results from ArcticNet science programs to produce regional reports on the implications 
of climate change for the Arctic.  There are four IRIS designated areas; IRIS 1 encompasses the 
Western and Central Arctic including the ISR and the Kitikmeot region of Nunavut. IRIS is 
intended to contribute the knowledge needed to formulate policies and adaptation strategies for 
the Canadian coastal Arctic by providing information and recommendations to assist policy and 
regional decision-makers on the impacts of climate change to physical and socioeconomic 
environments.  
 
3.4 Study Methods 
The three initiatives were examined based on a review of research reports and policy and 
planning documents, supplemented by semi-structured interviews, and observation at 
conferences.  In addition to international peer reviewed journal literature, data sources included 
conference proceedings, government documents, industry reports, websites and regional 
planning documents (Table 3-1).  Documents were reviewed to identify each initiative’s 
foundation, objectives and purpose and procedural components including stakeholder 
participation, coordination with other initiatives, and tiering to influence lower level decision-
making, such as project-based impact assessment. 
A total of 76 participants were contacted for interviews of which 50 agreed to participate. 
Interviews were on average 90 minutes in length.  Interviews with Inuvialuit co-management 
boards and northern governments were conducted in-person in Inuvik, Northwest Territories. 
The remainder occurred over the telephone.  Interview participants were selected based on their 
experience in and knowledge of offshore oil and gas development, planning and decision-making 
in the Beaufort Sea.  Participants were members of the various Inuvialuit co-management boards 
and agencies and the Joint Secretariat (n = 11); the ISR Municipal Government (n = 2); the 
Gwich’in Chiefs and Gwich’in Resource Board (n = 3); the oil and gas industry (n = 6); the 
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Government of the Northwest Territories, specifically the Water Board, Industry Tourism and 
Investment, and the Department of Executive (n = 4); the Federal Government, comprised of 
AANDC, CEAA, DFO, NEB, and NRCan (n = 13); private consultants  (n = 5); ENGOs (n = 2); 
and other energy interest groups (n = 4) researching or working in the region. 
Participants were asked a series of semi-structured questions exploring: i) the 
background, purpose and intent of each initiative; ii) emerging benefits, opportunities, challenges 
and limitations of each initiative; and iii) coordination and communication efforts amongst 
initiatives.  Interview results were organized, coded thematically and analyzed using QSR 
NVivo© v.9, a computer software program designed to classify and manage qualitative 
information.  In cases where participants did not want their comments attributed to their 
department, or where their personal identity may be compromised, they are referred to in the 
results only by the broader organization with which they are affiliated. 
 
Table 3-1.  Supplementary Sources of Information 
 !
Resources  Marine Initiatives  
BREA IOMP IRIS 
Conference  
observations 
and 
proceedings  
Canada – United States 
Northern Oil and Gas 
Research Forum, 
Calgary, AB, 30 
November - 2  
December 2010. 
 
IRIS 1 Regional 
Workshop, Inuvik, NT, 
11-15 April 2011 
 
IPY: From Knowledge 
to Action Conference, 
Montreal, QC, 23- 27 
April 2012. 
 IRIS 1 Regional Workshop, 
Inuvik, NT, 11-15 April 
2011 
 
IPY: From Knowledge to 
Action Conference, 
Montreal, QC, 23- 27 April 
2012. 
Grey literature 
 
BREA Request for 
Proposals 2011- 2012 
 
Geoffroy and Gauthier 
2011, Beaufort Sea Data 
Mining Project 
 
Beaufort Sea Partnership 
Integrated Ocean 
Management Plan 
(IOMP) for the Beaufort 
Sea: 2009 and Beyond, 
2009.  
 
ArcticNet (2010) Impacts 
of Environmental Change 
in the Canadian Coastal 
Arctic: A Compendium of 
Research Conducted during 
ArcticNet Phase I (2004-
2008). 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Integrated Ocean Management Plan 
Benefits and Opportunities 
The IOMP’s collaborative, multi-stakeholder arrangement was the most notable benefit reported 
by participants.  Focused on specific oceans management challenges, the IOMP was seen as 
providing an access point for government agencies, Aboriginal peoples, industry and other 
interested partners to share information and discuss values and goals for ocean resource use and 
management.  The participatory framework that facilitated the IOMP played an important role in 
its endorsement in 2010. One federal government participant noted:  
 
The reality across the Beaufort Sea region is that political, economic, and 
cultural contexts are extremely diverse and the biggest opportunity is that the 
collaborative partnership formed could be advantageously transferred to forward 
other initiatives.  
 
IOMP participants identified its comprehensive scope as a strength, citing how it linked 
management issues across marine and coastal ecosystems and addressed uses of the marine 
environment and related impacts at a regional scale.  One Joint Secretariat participant described 
this approach to managing impacts at a level above an individual resource sector as the IOMP’s 
most significant feature.  A number of participants commented positively on the opportunity to 
examine stressors, such as the impacts of climate change (e.g., retreating sea ice, which results in 
the opportunity for invasive species and range extensions of fish in Beaufort Sea populations), 
and enter into scenario and cumulative impact discussions before development proceeds.  This 
anticipatory nature of the IOMP, providing an opportunity to prevent harmful exploitation and 
unintended impacts from occurring, together with its long-term prospect with no end date, were 
acknowledged as both benefits and opportunities by one DFO participant.  An ENGO participant 
added that: 
…while some parties [members of IOMP] worried that they did not know where 
the Plan would lead, in terms of planning decisions or the need for regulatory 
reform, to do nothing was not an option, and the Plan enabled decision-making 
to occur with the best possible information, knowing that data will be revisited 
and consequently that management could be adapted in response to changing 
conditions.  
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The cascading situation where the IOMP sets high level goals, such that certain tools and 
instruments could then be developed allowing individual agencies to reach operational 
objectives, is seen as enabling a tiered forward-planning process.  Participants noted that the 
broad-based framework for protecting and understanding the marine environment provides an 
opportunity for certain instruments like marine spatial planning and marine protected areas to be 
accomplished under the IOMP. 
 
Limitations and Challenges 
Implementation and enforcement were two related and significant concerns identified by 
participants.  Impetus is hard to achieve with broad-based initiatives, one Inuvialuit board 
member explained, as the IOMP is “cumbersome and unfocused” and tries to tackle too many 
issues.  Participants, including industry, Inuvialuit and government addressed the challenges of 
applying concepts to a planning framework that were neither clearly nor easily definable, like 
‘health of the oceans’ and ‘sustainability’.  Although most participants described the IOMP as a 
valuable planning exercise and beneficial in principle, they also viewed it as deficient in practical 
implementation.  The absence of legislation to support planning and to accomplish IOMP goals 
was seen as a significant hindrance.  As explained by one Joint Secretariat participant:  
 
None of the legislative instruments: Fisheries Act, Oceans Act and IFA, are 
strong enough, or pertinent to sustain the health and well being of the Beaufort 
Sea...this is a capacity glitch of DFO, which has a strong coordination role under 
the Oceans Act but no mandate to lead or impose other member agencies to 
perform their roles and implement the Plan. 
 
According to an industry participant, the challenge with IOMP implementation was the 
absence of overarching governance in the region, noting that while the plan aimed to create a 
comprehensive approach it was “impeded by the silos effect it sought to overcome.”  The IOMP 
is a means to bring everyone together, explained one territorial government participant, but it 
“does not change what each member is doing with regard to research in the region.”  Industry 
voiced concern that a non-binding plan could further complicate planning and development in 
the region.  This participant stated “people say put the information out there – it will help, but 
from a regulatory perspective it may create tension,” for example, if a map were produced that 
identified a certain area as sensitive which had already been subject to oil and gas leasing. 
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A second concern was the lack of funding and capacity.  One Joint Secretariat participant 
identified the lack of funding for IOMP implementation, and for tools that would attach to the 
IOMP (e.g., marine protected area establishment), as a “total failure of government.”  Several 
participants involved with the IOMP’s working groups maintained that without legislative 
backing it is difficult to acquire the funding required to fulfill the IOMP’s objectives.  Funding 
restrictions were also said to inhibit the capacity of IOMP members to be involved.  A Joint 
Secretariat participant explained that their involvement, through the participation as chair of the 
council and steering committee, was not as meaningful as it could be largely because of capacity 
issues and not having the resources to perform background research.  The participant went on to 
add: 
 
It is the same people doing the work, and there is limited constituency, and at the 
regional level it is fairly small organizations trying to accomplish big things 
without sufficient funding resources.  Community involvement on behalf of the 
Inuvialuit, for instance, with six communities, stresses community resources. 
IOMP may engage participants with a speciality in traditional knowledge, and if 
it is the same people you are asking questions to over time, then the quality of 
input diminishes. 
 
A federal government regulator added that a common problem encountered with all regional 
planning exercises is that concerns and solutions are identified but resources are rarely available 
for implementation.  
Finally, interviews revealed industry’s scepticism about the IOMP delivering any tangible 
benefits in the near future, with no expectation of it being able to directly support oil and gas 
planning, impact assessment and decision-making.  Those participants advocating the potential 
of the IOMP suspected that the oil and gas industry’s concern was a result of the perception that 
it could impact their bottom line by compromising access and affecting the certainty of licensing 
approvals, leading to restrictive operating conditions.  However, these views were not expressed 
by the industry. Instead, one industry participant stated: 
 
DFO is not our key regulator and the initiative is not legally binding, instead 
being policy based; therefore, while the knowledge of resources and habitats is 
improving, there is currently no clear indication as to how the exercise will 
influence oil and gas decision-making in a positive, effective way.  If it were an 
integrated forum where resource managers bought into it, sure there could be 
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benefits as it draws people together, but in practice other departments haven’t 
bought in and it is seen as a DFO initiative. 
 
Another industry participant said that there needed to be more buy in from federal departments 
for the IOMP to effectively influence oil and gas decision-making, and resource managers, 
namely Environment Canada, DFO and AANDC “need to collaborate in a more meaningful 
manner.”  Overall, interview results showed that without a functional governance framework, 
decisions championed in the IOMP could contradict or create tension with established 
management structures.  
 
3.5.2 Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment 
Benefits and Opportunities 
Industry attributed BREA’s success to its support of offshore activity without delving into high 
level governance issues. BREA facilitates discussions relevant to the regulatory process, 
explained one industry participant, and will help AANDC execute its duties concerning offshore 
development in a more effective way.  Consistent with BREA’s intent, one federal government 
regulator maintained that:  
 
In an era of fiscal constraints, particularly towards science, BREA has allowed 
[AANDC] to gather information vital to future oil and gas decision-making.  It 
will make information readily available in an understandable format for all 
parties and stakeholders at technical and community useable levels. 
 
A territorial government participant noted that BREA was the “first real money” the 
federal government has put toward assessing data gaps in the last twenty years, and in doing so 
represents a considerable commitment toward the Beaufort region and pending hydrocarbon 
development.  An IRC participant similarly noted that BREA represented an investment to the 
Beaufort Sea that would result in new science and data that will better inform management 
decisions.  A private consultant explained that “BREA will inevitably support development in 
the region” because it “will fill knowledge gaps in the offshore that if not filled could stop 
projects from going ahead,” such as current knowledge gaps in deep water with respect to fish.”  
Interviewees from industry, Inuvialuit boards and agencies, and federal regulators all 
identified making scientific and socioeconomic data more accessible as a primary goal of BREA.  
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Participants noted that by addressing data gaps and providing regional baseline data there would 
be time and cost savings to all parties involved in an energy project environmental assessment 
process.  From the Joint Secretariat perspective, for example, there was optimism that BREA 
would help streamline project evaluations by addressing, up front, a number of issues that occur 
in each individual project environmental assessment, such as waste management.  It was 
explained that the regional approach adopted by BREA was intended to identify features that 
could be dealt with once, on a regional basis, thus providing an acceptable baseline that others 
could reference and enable the unique characteristics of the project specific environment to be 
addressed in more detailed project-specific assessments.  A more efficient process could occur, 
explained one federal regulator, if proponents “do not have to repeatedly address concerns about 
regional species distribution.”  By addressing certain issues on a regional scale, and having 
agencies and stakeholders agree on evaluations of potential impacts, several Inuvialuit 
participants reported this could ease the burden placed on communities during individual project 
application and assessment processes.  As one participant explained, “people realized that it is 
expensive and time consuming and puts a lot of pressure on communities for consultation if 
every time you do something you need to go through entire EA review.”  An AANDC 
participant further added: 
 
…if we can overlap that project specific EA on the regional EA conditions then 
we are taking some of the onus off the proponent and putting it back on the 
responsible authority to describe our understanding of the environment.  By 
overlaying it you have a risk analysis, based on the regional picture, then when 
evaluating project specific EA you are evaluating it more critically.  The 
regional EA can provide that basic regional template. 
 
Interview results indicated overall that there are common issues that could be addressed for the 
entire Beaufort Sea.  As explained by one industry participant, “if BREA generated information 
that had buy in from all parties, companies could supplement the process with detailed studies 
guided and informed by regional data, as opposed to re-generating information repeatedly,” as is 
the current state.  
Finally, BREA’s framework, which is founded on stakeholder involvement through 
industry support and Aboriginal leadership, was identified by industry as a process in which the 
“Inuvialuit are very much engaged participants, with a degree of ownership.”  One territorial 
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government participant noted that the research that industry, individual government departments 
and international organizations conduct makes the region a complicated and active science 
environment, and that “the forum arrangement set up by AANDC allows for participants to share 
information and coordinate activities.”  According to an AANDC participant, BREA’s venue 
brought stakeholders together to address issues not easily dealt with in the regulatory setting, 
such as preparedness, and building a knowledge base in communities through consultations and 
workshops.  An NRCan participant explained that the multi-stakeholder element of BREA is “...a 
beneficial approach to distinguish whether identified science gaps are true science gaps in terms 
of making more informed decisions, prioritizing research to address the intent, and supporting 
front line EA decision-making.”  
 Several industry participants also reported that consultations with communities under the 
BREA initiative would ensure that regional scale issues are addressed, thus allowing more 
project-specific issues to be the focus of questions raised during the environmental assessment 
process.  Collectively, participants reported the value of having discussions in the absence of 
project applications, “meaning that people are thinking ahead in terms of what they will need to 
have in place and be prepared for.”   
 
Limitations and Challenges 
Many participants expressed frustration with how BREA unfolded, noting that the purpose of 
BREA was well-founded but that the objectives have since changed.  Several Inuvialuit 
participants noted that BREA was “not to be a funding pot for other programs”, but that many 
“satellite research programs are latching on to BREA funds” and diminishing its intent as a 
regional environmental assessment.  Some territorial government and Joint Secretariat 
participants noted that BREA’s shift in focus from what the Inuvialuit had originally requested, a 
regional and strategic environmental assessment process, to that of a series of regional baseline 
studies was a political move by the federal government to control and reinforce their role in the 
offshore arena.  Several Inuvialuit participants expressed frustration that BREA changed course 
as a result of decisions being made at a higher level.  For example, a Joint Secretariat participant 
said that BREA was getting “hijacked” because of government funding cuts elsewhere and thus 
other government departments are becoming reliant on BREA funds.  One federal regulator 
explained: 
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It is a complicated and cumbersome process…having too many people’s 
opinions and trying to do things by consensus.  Delayed decisions have therefore 
frustrated the Inuvialuit, who see the initiative being driven by science 
departments that see an opportunity to get funding to do research, and 
bulldozing through the process with little respect for northern needs. 
 
BREA terminology also presented challenges, as people were critical that BREA is not 
actually an ‘environmental assessment.’  One industry proponent noted that “people constantly 
query ‘what’ is being assessed.”  The participant went on to explain that the Inuvialuit wanted 
baseline data to go toward an assessment, and that “it is vital to keep the EA component because 
without it the initiative would lack a goal.”  A federal government participant, however, offered a 
different opinion and said that the direction of BREA had shifted as a result of AANDC’s 
hesitancy to go ahead with a regional strategic assessment: “an intentional move away from a 
regional assessment to that of a science synthesis given the lack of capacity to perform one.”  
A related concern was BREA’s scope and methodology.  One NEB participant explained 
that challenges related to scoping influenced BREA’s direction, because at the onset of BREA 
the inability to reach consensus on how to move forward was complicated by many factors, 
including land claim and sovereignty issues.  This meant that the “only way to design the project 
so that it could deliver results was to scope it tightly around science.”  The participant went on to 
note that a lot of weight was given to a “bottom-up” approach to scoping BREA, versus having a 
prescribed list of issues to address.  However, an NRCan participant explained that upon 
conducting community consultations the regional issues identified were relatively modest 
compared to the large technical proposals submitted and subsequently funded under BREA.  This 
experience highlights the challenge of developing a program with clear objectives at the 
management level and doing so in a manner that enables flexibility and inclusion of interests and 
affected parties.  The result, noted one Inuvialuit participant, was that “attention to community 
effects is on the weak side.”  
Other methodological limitations noted by interviewees included a BREA timeframe that 
was deemed too restrictive, and insufficient funding to effectively begin to address the science 
gaps identified.  A Joint Secretariat participant described BREA as a “tactical plan that is short 
term, where a strategic long-term plan is needed.”  The participant explained that BREA was 
intended to address a significant gap in the Beaufort Sea, the lack of a cumulative effects 
framework, but given the limited budget allocated to the development of a cumulative effects 
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framework, over a four-year timeframe, “it is unlikely a suitable framework will result.”  An 
NRCan participant criticized BREA for its focus only on collecting baseline data on current 
conditions rather than undertaking a much broader scenario-based assessment of future 
conditions in the region to aid in planning and decision-making.  
Finally, implementation was a major concern voiced by the majority of participants.  For 
example, a Joint Secretariat participant noted:  
 
BREA will put information out there but it is not coordinating the efficiency of 
how information will be used…it is the age-old question whether the design of 
the programs will result in useable data.  How BREA will facilitate, feed or front 
load the specific EA approvals for development plans and applications remains 
unknown. 
 
One DFO regulator participant said even when BREA is completed data mining may still be 
required to locate pertinent information for specific development decisions, adding that there 
“needs to be a tool to manage information and a person designated responsible for the tool.”  
This notion of BREA as a “one-off” exercise was identified by most participants as something 
that could jeopardize any progress achieved through the initiative itself.  An industry participant 
stressed that “government needs to not only sign on to data so that it does not need to be revisited 
during each EA, but ensure information is updated and carried forward to enable EA studies to 
be plugged into a regional assessment.”  One CEAA participant expressed concern that scientists 
may be “blindly conducting science without context,” and in the end BREA will be little more 
than a data gathering exercise rather than an analytical process intended to support decisions 
about offshore development.  
 
3.5.3 Integrated Regional Impact Studies 
Benefits and Opportunities 
The IRIS is focused on repackaging and synthesizing information already generated through a 
number of different disciplinary focused research projects into a more accessible format.  
Science investment in the Beaufort Sea region is quite rich in terms of programming from the 
International Polar Year, and IRIS builds on that by offering scenarios for climate change in 
order to assist development proponents and decision-makers.  Participants recognized that the 
value of the initiative comes from its attention to climate change scenarios, an area of science 
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particularly critical in the Arctic where climate change impacts and the progressive loss of sea 
ice bring unpredictability to oil and gas operations.  Addressing information gaps through 
collaborative research initiatives between academia and the oil and gas industry was reported by 
participants to have generated information that will benefit policy makers, regulators, industry, 
northern residents and other stakeholders.  As Pyc and Fortier (2011:9) explained, “because of 
the collaboration, much of this information not only informs risk-based assessment and 
responsible operations, but also contributes to the general scientific knowledge of this remote, 
extreme and important Arctic environment.”  Participants knowledgeable about IRIS reported the 
practical value of synthesizing existing data, as opposed to undertaking an exercise that does not 
guarantee tangible results. 
 
Limitations and Challenges 
A major challenge related to IRIS’s structure and the lack of clarity about its provisions and 
output.  One ArcticNet IRIS participant explained: 
 
The structure has been a contentious topic because there has not been a clear 
vision or direction of the IRIS format and how to conduct the study, making it a 
discombobulated process.  This challenge emerged with previous IRIS’ in the 
eastern Arctic where no one knows what the IRIS is and how it should be 
produced…it will be somewhat organically generated integrated regional 
impacts, based on funded projects in the region. 
 
The IRIS 1 boundary crosses Nunavut and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region.A participant from 
the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation was unsure how IRIS 1 would support policy and decision-
making if results are politically incompatible, based on ecosystem boundaries versus 
administrative boundaries.  Several Inuvialuit Regional Corporation and Joint Secretariat 
participants noted that IRIS’s “community based science was weak and the initial 
communication strategy to involve communities was poor.”  A DFO regulator identified the need 
for ArcticNet and their studies to engage northern regulators, stating that IRIS “knows the 
communities are important, but misses the people who actually make the decisions.”  Many 
northern participants viewed the academic foundation of ArcticNet with cynicism.  The manner 
in which results are reported, as evidenced by previous ArcticNet undertakings in the eastern 
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Arctic, were, according to one regulator, based “largely in the south, not in the north, nor to 
regulators in the north.”    
 
3.6 Discussion 
Three key issues emerged as essential to the efficacy of current IOMP, BREA and IRIS 
initiatives in supporting a more coordinated, regional approach to marine resource planning and 
management related to pressing offshore development.  These include horizontal integration 
between management bodies, vertical tiering from the strategic level and regional scale to the 
operational level and project scale, and the establishment of an overarching vision for regional 
planning and development in the Beaufort Sea.  
 
3.6.1 Horizontal Integration 
If planning, assessment and science initiatives such as the IOMP, BREA and IRIS are expected 
to provide direction and guidance for ocean activities, and contribute to a better understanding of 
regional environmental effects and meet agreed-upon management objectives, both 
independently and collectively, improved horizontal integration is required.  For instance, when 
considering the design and implementation of regional programs Noble and Harriman (2008) 
argue that “greater attention must be paid to horizontal linkages between strategies… and 
reporting systems.”  Crowder and Norse (2008) explain that the current sectoral-based approach 
has resulted in fragmentation, and spatial and temporal mismatches in governance of the marine 
ecosystem.  Murawski (2007) further maintains that it is not always the science that is limiting to 
advance the understanding of factors influencing ecosystems, but the will of political systems to 
make decisions in controversial and uncertain circumstances.  
The multijurisdictional context in which the IOMP and BREA operate is characterized by 
a large multi-stakeholder process with two separate federal authorities trying to assert their 
respective planning and management mandates.  The research participants were sceptical that 
IOMP endorsement on behalf of federal departments could be equated with actual support, 
owing in part to what Jessen (2011) describes as “federal silos” that impede agency cooperation. 
Lane (2008: 860) identifies such fragmentation of environmental responsibilities among 
government departments as a hindrance to managing resources “…in a way that recognizes their 
inter-dependence with the wider human–ecological system, or to manage them in concert with 
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other departments.”  Regulatory authorities remain responsible for implementing management 
policies and measures within their established mandates.  Yet, management initiatives cannot 
successfully operate without a strong institutional framework that establishes cooperation 
between departments and stakeholders and sets appropriate timelines, irrespective of potentially 
conflicting agendas.  Bellamy (2007), cited in Lockwood et al. (2009), refers to the need to 
balance co-operation and competition arising from organizational self-interest as a key challenge 
to regional natural resource management.  
The results in Canada’s western Arctic revealed ‘possessiveness’ amongst federal 
departments and the need for greater communication and cooperation of initiatives by high-level 
secretariats.  This reflects the view of Keogh et al. (2006), in that stronger leadership is required 
to bring efforts into a coordinated program to achieve meaningful results at a strategic level.  The 
initiatives examined in this paper all started with good intentions to bring clarity to process and 
understanding and to address regionally important issues.  While there is complementarity 
amongst the three initiatives, the results show that without clear and transparent horizontal 
linkages it would be difficult to achieve a functional system of governance to support improved 
development planning, assessment and decision-making in the Beaufort Sea.  
 
3.6.2 Vertical Tiering 
The results suggest some progress toward managing resources on a broader regional scale, and at 
a more strategic scale, but also reveal an overarching concern as to whether higher level planning 
initiatives can actually influence lower level development decisions.  Much of the work 
undertaken by the IOMP, BREA and IRIS do address issues that are directly relevant to lower 
level decision-making, such as project impact assessment; the challenge for all three initiatives is 
determining how the data and knowledge generated is best translated and used to actually 
influence lower level decision-making.  None of the three initiatives was envisioned to directly 
support project-level assessment, but rather to provide background information so that when 
making assessments and determining the significance of impacts there is data available upon 
which to base such decisions.  There is an assumption that the data and information generated 
will be useful to such assessment and decision-making processes, but there are no clear 
mechanisms to ensure either its use or its usefulness. 
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The transformative nature in which these three Arctic initiatives have emerged has 
allowed for flexibility in planning and scoping.  This flexibility and holistic approach have 
generated mixed responses, in particular for the IOMP, since critics question how such lofty 
goals like having a pristine environment and healthy fish stocks can be translated into usable 
decision support criteria for reviewing and evaluating the merits of individual applications for 
project developments.  If there is no concerted influence downstream, where decisions and 
actions are taken about physical development in the offshore, then the role of such higher level 
efforts may be trivial.  While there is the potential for strategic initiatives to support lower level 
decision-making, the critical information required at the project level needs to be identified and a 
mechanism created whereby the data generated are collated and translated into a usable format 
for project assessments (Noble 2003).  At the same time, the rationale for and process of 
integration between high-level policies and on-the-ground data collection and decision-making 
need to be clear to all stakeholders (Katsanevakis et al. 2011).  
 
3.6.3 Guiding Vision 
Whilst current initiatives in the Beaufort Sea have advanced past the mindset in which ‘tunnel 
vision’ decision-making is acceptable (see Murawski 2007), there is still no overarching and 
agreed upon vision to either guide or bridge the range of current marine planning and 
management efforts that exist.  Johnson et al. (2011) describe the importance of setting desired 
outcomes as part of a future vision of regional planning and development, and setting 
management strategies that are protective of those outcomes in order “to improve context and 
understanding of the kinds of development that can be supported, where it can be supported 
within a region and when.”  Johnson et al. (2011) also maintain that the public’s role in a 
regional visioning exercise is critical to “establish the link between what society wants for a 
given region and the management approaches and development strategies that will be designed 
to achieve them.”  At the international level, UNESCO’s Visions for a Sea Change (2006) 
similarly emphasizes the need for a clear strategic direction for what is to be achieved within an 
ocean management area to complement bottom-up stakeholder involvement and interests; to 
strengthen the vertical integration between national policy guidance and targets and their 
regional delivery; and facilitate horizontal integration across economic sectors or agencies of 
government (Ehler and Douvere 2007).   
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The author advocates that such a vision for Canada’s western Arctic would offer 
corresponding guidance mechanisms to help resolve overlap and the disjointed nature of current 
marine planning and management initiatives, and aid subsequent decision-making through an 
integrated framework.  However, without a policy component to address regulatory and planning 
deficiencies in the region, layering and overlap appear inevitable (see Jessen 2011) – especially 
given that a different institution administers each initiative.  The results indicate agreement that 
strategic planning is recognized as important in the Beaufort Sea (see also Ketilson 2011); 
however, there remains much opposition to developing an Arctic vision and cynicism toward 
translating a strategic vision into operational terms.  The reasons identified are threefold: first, 
regional strategic approaches to planning and assessment in the context of ocean management 
are still not well defined and effective implementation strategies not developed; second, 
successful implementation would require restructuring of current management institutions; and 
third, there is concern that additional planning efforts would result in yet another bureaucratic 
layer to a decision-making environment that is described by many as cumbersome.   
These views reflect what Murawski (2007) refers to in the context of ecosystem-based 
management as myths; that is, propagated principals to maintain status quo among sectoral 
interests.  Murawski maintains that such resistance is due to the perception that unlike sectoral 
management, the benefits and objectives are not as well defined as they are for an individual 
sector.  The unknown nature of measures necessary to meet regional ocean management goals 
can therefore result in resistance to its adoption and thus to a more effective bases for marine 
spatial management. 
Murawski’s (2007) view, however, is not without some opposition.  Arkema et al. (2006), 
for example, report than when translated from academic literature to practice, the objectives of 
regional and strategic planning and management initiatives often miss critical ecological and 
human factors emphasized in literature, and planners and managers often lack a clear approach 
or toolset for implementing such overarching planning and management programs (see also 
Noble et al. 2012).  Similarly, with no articulated vision of what Canada is trying to achieve in 
Arctic Ocean management, participants view the lack of integration amongst current initiatives 
as contributing to layering, and a major constraint toward achieving a more cohesive regional 
planning framework.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
This paper set out to examine stakeholder perceptions regarding the challenges and opportunities 
of current marine planning, assessment and science initiatives in Canada’s western Arctic and 
whether and how these initiatives effectively facilitate marine resource planning, assessment and 
decision-making in light of mounting pressures for offshore energy development.  It is necessary 
to further our scientific understanding of the Arctic environment; however, there is also need for 
a framework that moves beyond data collection to inform the creation and analysis of future 
development scenarios such that potential cumulative effects, regional impact mitigation and 
monitoring needs can effectively direct decision-making about offshore energy development.  
This is beyond the collective abilities of current offshore planning, assessment and science 
initiatives in the Beaufort Sea.  Currently, the IOMP, BREA and IRIS operate without a regional 
framework for effective integration – the potential for duplication, inefficiencies and even 
contradiction abounds. 
There is need for a more integrative and strategic planning and assessment framework in 
the Beaufort Sea – a framework to coordinate current initiatives, combine data for planning and 
assessment, and set strategic priorities for the future management, development and conservation 
of the region.  In the author’s view, this may be achieved, at least in part, through regional 
strategic environmental assessment, a framework for assessing the potential environmental 
effects of alternative strategic initiatives, policies, plans, or programs for a region for the purpose 
of informing the preparation of a development strategy and associated environmental 
management framework (see CCME 2009).  The need for such an approach is particularly urgent 
given expanding interests in offshore development (Callow 2012), combined with recent changes 
to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act that significantly reduce the timelines for 
assessment and restrict the scope of federal assessment applications (see Gibson 2012).  
Although various models of regional strategic environmental assessment have begun to emerge 
in offshore jurisdictions internationally (see Fidler and Noble 2012), the concept remains 
untested in Canada’s western Arctic. 
 
!!
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CHAPTER 4 
ADVANCING REGIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN 
CANADA’S WESTERN ARCTIC: IMPLEMENTATION OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES 
!
Preface to Chapter 4 
This Chapter addresses the third objective of the thesis, identify key opportunities for, and 
challenges to, implementation of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea based on a normative model and 
stakeholder expectations of R-SEA.  The Chapter has been accepted for publication in Journal of 
Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, 2013, 15:1, co-authored by Fidler (lead 
author) and Noble.  !!
Abstract 
The absence of Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment (R-SEA) in Canada’s western 
Arctic has raised many questions concerning the country’s preparedness for offshore Arctic 
energy development, given the constraints of project assessments in addressing long-term 
cumulative impacts of energy development on the marine environment and local communities.  
There has been much interest in R-SEA in recent years, and a growing body of research on the 
benefits of strategic approaches to environmental assessment, but relatively little attention has 
been given to implementation.  This paper examines key opportunities for and challenges to the 
implementation of R-SEA in Canada’s western Arctic. Results reinforce concerns that the 
current approach to environmental assessment in Canada’s western Arctic is insufficient to 
address expanding offshore energy development.  However, results also indicate several 
challenges to be addressed to advance R-SEA in the offshore environment including governance, 
stakeholder resistance to a futures-based approach, the timing of implementation, managing the 
diversity of expectations about R-SEA, and the nature and scope of alternatives assessment. !
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4.1 Introduction 
Oil and gas exploration licenses continue to be let in the deep offshore of Canada’s western 
Arctic, resulting in new questions around Canada’s preparedness for drilling in frontier regions 
(Elvin and Fraser 2012).  Tensions regarding the planning and management of offshore energy 
development is particularly evident in the hydrocarbon rich Beaufort Sea, where challenges over 
energy development are intensified by controversial relief well regulation; risk and benefit 
debates for those who inhabit the region (see Porta and Bankes 2011); concern regarding long-
term impacts on an ecologically sensitive marine environment (Burkett 2011); and the 
uncertainties of Arctic climate change (Prowse et al. 2009).  This culmination of conditions, 
along with the current project-driven regulatory environment, has generated considerable 
discussion on the need for regional strategic environmental assessment (R-SEA) (see Noble et al. 
2013; Doelle et al. 2012; WWF 2005).  
The Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) (2009) defines R-SEA 
as a “process designed to systematically assess the potential environmental effects, including 
cumulative effects, of alternative strategic initiatives, policies, plans or programs (PPPs) for a 
particular region.”  The overall objective of R-SEA is to inform the preparation of a development 
strategy and environmental management framework for a region (CCME 2009) and, in doing so, 
identify strategies and priorities for future management and development while enhancing the 
efficacy of project-level environmental assessment (EA) (see Harriman Gunn and Noble 2009a).  
The interest in regionally-based, strategic approaches to EA stems from the limited capacity of 
project-based EA to address cumulative effects (Elvin and Fraser 2012; Gunn and Noble 2011), 
the desire for Aboriginal groups to be more involved in development planning (see Porta and 
Bankes 2011), and the recognized need to ensure that development decisions are set within a 
broader environmental planning and management framework (CCME 2009).  In select 
international offshore oil and gas regimes, such as Norway, Atlantic Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, such higher-level approaches to assessment are already beginning to emerge in 
practice (Fidler and Noble 2012; Hasle et al. 2009).   
The absence of R-SEA in Canada’s western Arctic has raised many questions about 
Canada’s preparedness for offshore energy development (see Doelle et al., 2012; Elvin and 
Fraser 2012; Porta and Bankes 2011; Arctic Council 2009).  Notwithstanding several regional 
planning, baseline collection and science-based marine initiatives ongoing in Canada’s western 
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Arctic (e.g., Integrated Ocean Management Plan, Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment, 
Integrated Regional Impact Study), and recognition at the national (e.g., CCME 2009) and 
international levels (e.g., Arctic Council 2009) of the importance of R-SEA, there remains no 
consolidated framework of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea, and whether and how such a framework 
can or should be implemented remains unaddressed.  Research by Ketilson (2011) and Noble et 
al. (2013), for example, revealed scepticism around R-SEA in Canada’s Beaufort Sea, describing 
it as “unchartered territory” with many questions of whether and how it can deliver benefits and 
influence decision-making.  Part of the problem is that the majority of attention on the subject 
has been on the need for and benefits of such a framework (see Bina 2007) rather than on 
implementation issues to advance R-SEA from a novel concept to a practical planning, 
assessment and decision support process. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine key opportunities for and challenges to the 
implementation of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea of Canada’s western Arctic.  The current Beaufort 
Sea planning, assessment and decision-making environment is examined against the normative 
model and expectations of R-SEA.  Current support for R-SEA implementation for offshore 
planning and management is explored and areas of disagreement amongst stakeholders 
identified.  The intent is not to propose another layer of legislation to what is perceived by some 
as an already complex regulatory offshore environment (see Callow 2012), but to provide a 
foundation for advancing R-SEA from concept to practice.  In the following sections the 
conceptual basis for R-SEA is introduced and the current state of EA in the Beaufort Sea 
discussed.  Results report on the overall readiness for R-SEA implementation in the Beaufort Sea 
and the needs and interests of key actors.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of applying R-SEA and foreseeable challenges to implementation.  !
4.2 Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment 
Canada is recognized internationally as a pioneer in strategic environmental assessment (SEA) 
(see Sadler 2005); but the application of formal SEA in Canada is restricted to federal matters 
under a federal Cabinet Directive (see Noble 2009).  In 2008, the CCME, a forum of federal, 
provincial and territorial governments, commissioned a research program to develop a more 
regionalized framework for SEA in an attempt to extend SEA beyond the federal Cabinet 
Directive and to facilitate a more regional-based, planning approach to impact assessment.  The 
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intent was to develop a framework to guide the development of PPPs and strategic initiatives 
above the project tier, influencing regional development programs and project specific actions 
and decisions (see Table 4-1).  
Developed by Harriman Gunn and Noble (2009a), R-SEA was founded on SEA 
principles (see Vicente and Partidário 2006; Partidário 1996) as a means to ensure that planning 
and assessment for a region supports the most desired outcomes rather than the most likely ones.  
The goal was to advance a more regionally based EA and planning approach to address 
environmental and social issues at the strategic tier of decision-making (Harriman Gunn and 
Noble 2009a).  The focus of R-SEA is on informing the development or evaluation of alternative 
scenarios or PPPs for a region and then assessing those alternatives based on their potential for 
cumulative effects and in consideration of social, economic, environmental and planning goals 
(CCME 2009).  Amongst its defining features are its regional scope, strategic nature, and 
consideration of cumulative effects (Noble and Harriman 2009).  Its methodological approach is 
founded on the integration of existing knowledge, experience, and theory drawn from strategic 
(Vicente and Partidário 2006; Noble and Storey 2001; Partidário 2000), cumulative (Noble 2008; 
Dubé 2003; Bonnell and Storey 2000) and regional EA (Noble and Harriman 2008).  As a 
framework for regional application, it is intended to be context sensitive and “tailor-made to the 
kind of decisions at stake and the nature of the decision-making processes in place” (Partidário 
and Clark 2000).   
 
Table 4-1.  Potential Benefits of R-SEA 
• Facilitates the development of improved PPPs and strategic initiatives 
• Provides a more regional focus for development and decision-making  
• Ensures that cumulative effects assessment is captured at the appropriate tier and scale  
• Contributes to regional sustainability goals 
• Enables and encourages data sharing from regional and project impact monitoring programs  
• Facilitates state-of-the-region environmental monitoring and reporting  
• Saves time and resources by providing a means to streamline subsequent project EA  
• Establishes goals, thresholds, or maximum allowable limits against which to conduct project-
based performance and impact assessment 
Source: CCME (2009); Harriman Gunn and Noble (2009a) 
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4.3 R-SEA Framework 
The R-SEA framework and guiding principles are described in detail by Harriman Gunn and 
Noble (2009a) and the CCME (2009).  R-SEA consists of three interrelated phases: a pre-
assessment phase, an impact assessment and evaluation phase and a post-assessment phase, each 
with corresponding stages (see Figure 4-1).  The pre-assessment involves developing a reference 
framework, scoping key issues, and identifying drivers and patterns of change in the region and 
how they have influenced valued ecosystems components (VECs).  This requires identifying the 
main issues and concerns in the region along with the core principles that will be used to guide 
the assessment process.  Tiering opportunities with regional initiatives and EA are also 
identified, as are necessary partners and partnerships, and terms of reference for the R-SEA 
developed.  Scoping serves to establish VECs, temporal and spatial boundaries for the 
assessment, and sets management targets, objectives or thresholds against which future 
conditions and alternative scenarios of cumulative change can be assessed.  
 
 
 !
Figure 4-1.  Methodological Framework for R-SEA 
Source: CCME 2009, based on Noble and Harriman 2009; Noble and Storey 2001 
 
The impact assessment phase focuses on developing alternative options or scenarios of 
development and conservation for the region, and an assessment of the potential effects on, 
threats to, or changes in the state of VECs under each scenario.  Cumulative effects and 
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condition changes under each scenario are identified, and the significance of those changes and 
effects relative to current or past baseline conditions, thresholds, or desirable levels of change 
examined.  More than one strategic alternative may be the outcome, and the iterative nature of 
the process may require re-assessing alternatives based on consideration of mitigation and 
management needs. The objective is to establish a preferred or satisficing PPP direction. 
The post-assessment phase involves making plans to mitigate or compensate for 
potentially unavoidable impacts associated with the identified PPP, and developing a follow-up 
and monitoring program for effects monitoring, goals achievement or performance evaluation, 
feedback on management effectiveness, and communication.  This stage of the process is 
essential because PPPs are often formulated under uncertainty and their effectiveness is often 
sensitive to broader social and economic conditions (see CCME 2009; Cherp et al. 2007).  
Finally, in order to facilitate implementation and ensure that PPP strategies are put into action, 
there is a need to prescribe roles and resources for implementation and on-going monitoring; 
undertake a formal public review process of the proposed strategy, and establish a regular review 
period to revisit the PPP, evaluate its efficacy and adjust accordingly. 
 
4.4 Research Methods 
4.4.1 Beaufort Sea Study Area 
The Beaufort Sea Large Ocean Management Area (LOMA) covers over one million km2, 
encompassing the marine portion of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, and has been identified as 
one of five priority areas for integrated ocean management by the Government of Canada (Cobb 
et al. 2008).  The area contains the Tarium Niryutait Marine Protected Area and is rich in 
biological diversity, including benthic fauna, birds, marine and anadromous fish (e.g., arctic cod, 
arctic char, salmon), terrestrial mammals (e.g., caribou, arctic fox, lynx, arctic hare), and marine 
mammals (e.g., bowhead whales, beluga whales, ringed seal, walrus, polar bear) (Cobb et al. 
2008).  The marine resources of the Beaufort Sea provide sustenance and have been part of 
Inuvialuit fishing and hunting practices for centuries.  The Beaufort Sea is also rich in 
hydrocarbon resources (Callow 2012; INAC 2010; Harrison 2006).  Prior to 2007, the majority 
of hydrocarbon exploration and development was restricted to the continental shelf and 
nearshore region.  In recent years exploration licenses have been let in the deep offshore, raising 
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concern about industry and government preparedness for drilling in frontier regions (Porta and 
Bankes 2011).  
 Under the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA), a negotiated agreement between the 
Inuvialuit of Canada’s Northwest Territories and the Government of Canada to establish the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region, the Inuvialuit ceded their rights in the offshore areas; however, 
they still provide input regarding offshore oil and gas development decisions on federal lands in 
their settlement region and maintain a role and interest in offshore governance.  The IFA 
provides a framework for co-management in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region between the 
Inuvialuit and the federal government.  However, for all intents and purposes, the Government of 
Canada retains ownership and authority to manage the offshore resources of the Beaufort Sea.  
The National Energy Board and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
(AANDC) have independent but complementary roles in energy exploration and development in 
the Beaufort Sea: the National Energy Board authorizes drilling, while AANDC administers 
rights to oil exploration. Fisheries and Oceans Canada manages development authorizations 
under the Fisheries Act (1985), and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (2012) applies 
to projects whenever a federal authority has a decision-making responsibility. 
Project-based EA is the primary tool for planning for, assessing, and managing the 
impacts of offshore energy development. Challenges to EA and regulation for offshore oil and 
gas in the Beaufort Sea have been documented by Noble et al. (2013) and others (Doelle et al. 
2012; Ketilson 2011; Voutier et al. 2008; Erlandson and Sloan 2001), and include the narrow 
scope of EA and limited reach beyond the individual development project, uncertainty and 
efficiency of the process, the potential for duplication of efforts in project assessment, and the 
lack of capacity to implement EA and regulatory programs.  These limitations, combined with 
recent legislative and regulatory reforms to EA (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012) 
in Canada at the federal level that further limit the scope of EA application, including the 
exemption of small projects (e.g., exploration), and set maximum 24-month time frames for the 
review of large projects (e.g., offshore development), have generated considerable interest in 
regional and strategic approaches to offshore planning and assessment in the western Arctic.  
Notwithstanding current, independent programs in the western Arctic focused on marine 
planning (e.g., Integrated Oceans Management Plan (IOMP)), baseline studies (e.g., Beaufort 
Regional Environmental Assessment (BREA)), and scientific understanding of climate change 
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(e.g., Integrated Regional Impact Studies (IRIS)), there is no integrative planning and impact 
assessment framework to support PPP development and decisions about marine resource use, 
particularly with regard to deep offshore energy.  What R-SEA is and what it should deliver in 
the western Arctic is “still far from consolidated” (Ketilson 2011: 2); R-SEA remains largely 
untested and the capacity for implementation is unknown. 
 
4.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection was based on semi-structured interviews with Inuvialuit co-management boards 
and agencies and the Joint Secretariat (n = 11); the Inuvialuit Settlement Region Municipal 
Government (n = 2); the Gwich’in Chiefs and Gwich’in Resource Board (n = 3); the oil and gas 
industry (n = 6); the Government of the Northwest Territories, specifically the Water Board, 
Industry Tourism and Investment, and the Department of Executive (n = 4); the Federal 
Government, comprised of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the National Energy Board, 
and Natural Resources Canada (n = 13); private consultants  (n = 5); environmental non-
government organizations (n = 2); and academics and other energy interest groups (n = 4) 
researching or working in the region.  Interviews with Inuvialuit and northern governments were 
conducted in-person in Inuvik, Northwest Territories.  The remainder occurred over the 
telephone.  Interview participants were selected based on their experience in and knowledge of 
offshore oil and gas development, planning and decision-making in the Beaufort Sea.  
Participants were asked a series of semi-structured questions exploring: i) existing 
challenges and opportunities with the current approach to and provisions for offshore oil and gas 
impact assessment, planning, management and decision-making in the Beaufort Sea; and ii) 
critical factors, issues and concerns to be addressed through R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea, 
including participant views on stakeholder roles and the responsible authorities to lead and 
manage R-SEA.  Interview results were organized using the CCME R-SEA framework described 
above as a general guide, coded thematically and analyzed using QSR NVivo© v.9, a computer 
software program designed to classify and manage qualitative information.  
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4.5 Results 
Results are presented below based on each of the three broad phases of R-SEA: pre-assessment, 
assessment and post-assessment.  In cases where participants did not want their comments 
attributed to their department, they are referenced by the broader organization with which they 
are affiliated. 
 
4.5.1 Pre-Assessment Phase 
There was a diversity of expectations on an appropriate reference framework for R-SEA, 
specifically what R-SEA should deliver in the Beaufort Sea.  For industry, an expectation of R-
SEA was to deliver greater certainty through predictability and consistency in the regulatory 
process. “Being able to have clear guidance on the where’s and when’s allows for more effective 
planning,” explained one industry proponent.  A federal government participant explained that 
R-SEA should be designed to “expedite the EA permitting stage by addressing problems early, 
and proactively solving them, rather than the current approach that is focused on mitigating 
negative impacts.”  Inuvialuit, ENGO, and some government participants advocated for R-SEA 
as an early assessment tool that could potentially restrict development activity if the results from 
a preliminary analysis were unfavourable, either in terms of environmental sensitivities or data 
gaps.  As one ENGO participant explained, the current approach under EA is “how can we; with 
R-SEA it is ‘should we.”  The majority of Inuvialuit participants said that R-SEA should be a 
front-end assessment of conditions, when preparing leases and putting areas up for auction and 
tenure, to guide whether and how areas are opened for future development.  
There was agreement amongst participants regarding enforceability and responsibility for 
R-SEA.  Most said that R-SEA should be regulated so that it is enforceable and provides 
certainty in planning and decision-making.  However, one ENGO participant explained that 
greater certainty meant different things to different stakeholders: for some, certainty through R-
SEA means greater support for establishing marine conservation areas; for industry certainty 
means that project approvals are expedited; for the Inuvialuit it means that their right to access 
and benefit from marine resources is protected.  
There was also agreement that responsibility for R-SEA implementation should be shared 
between the federal government and Inuvialuit, with strong industry involvement.  An 
environmental consultant noted that creating a new body for R-SEA “would add to the 
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perception of regulatory complexity…thus it would be better to expand and support [an existing] 
regulatory body through better funding, staff and technical support.”  A federal government 
participant maintained that the only way for R-SEA to be successful is through a process 
founded on stakeholder involvement so that “all interested and affected parties have a 
meaningful place at the table to influence decision-making and identify potentially conflicting 
values and ensuring such issues are addressed in the scoping stage.”  An ‘industry-led’ initiative 
was proposed by many industry and private consultant participants, with one participant 
explaining that “industry has financial resources so a partnership is ideal, and an umbrella 
partnership with industry, federal government and Inuvialuit could eliminate the ‘us and them’ 
mentality that currently exists.”  Such an umbrella partnership with industry was viewed with 
scepticism by other participants, including Inuvialuit.  According to an Inuvialuit participant, the 
Inuvialuit view R-SEA as a means to “long term empowerment contributing increased 
confidence in decision-making, versus the current landscape which is plagued with contempt at 
the regional level as to how decisions are made at the federal level.”  
Participants deemed it necessary that R-SEA incorporate existing initiatives in the 
Beaufort Sea, namely IOMP, BREA and IRIS, and build upon already identified data and 
knowledge gaps, and address sociocultural and economic impacts.  Most Inuvialuit participants 
recognized the need to ‘scope-in’ onshore sociocultural and economic values in R-SEA for 
offshore development as a priority issue; industry, government and ENGO alike supported this 
need.  The difficulty, one Inuvialuit participant explained, is that legislation does not address 
socioeconomic impacts the same way it does biophysical, and offshore activities have shown 
very little socioeconomic benefit for the Inuvialuit.  When industries seek access to resources 
onshore they are required under the Inuvialuit Final Agreement to negotiate benefit agreements.  
Although industry is not legally required to do so offshore, some companies have voluntarily 
struck benefit agreements.  For example, one industry participant explained that “the Inuvialuit 
wish to have offshore plans tailored to them as long-term development; we [industry proponent] 
feel this is reasonable to respect and have entered into agreements with the IRC [Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation].”  However, this particular company’s opinion was not widely supported; 
other industry interviewees were opposed to reaching voluntary agreements with the Inuvialuit 
for offshore development, noting that regulatory framework does not require such actions.  
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A final issue raised concerned baseline data.  Results indicated disagreement, particularly 
amongst those consultants involved in offshore EA practice, as to the amount and adequacy of 
existing baseline data. Some participants said that there is a large amount of existing information, 
but that there are still significant data gaps that need to be addressed.  One environmental 
consultant noted that “EAs conducted offshore in the 80s were nearshore, primarily scientific, 
focused on oil spill response, and the regulatory regime was quite different then,” thus 
highlighting the need for new data to adequately assess proposed drilling in the deep offshore.  In 
contrast, another environmental consultant stressed that the necessary data is available, but it is 
not effectively managed.  The participant explained “there is a tremendous amount of 
information that isn’t being as used as effectively as it could be. R-SEA would not involve 
ascertaining new data, rather taking existing information and formatting it into a vehicle more 
readily accessible and understandable.” 
 
4.5.2 Impact Assessment Phase  
The use of alternatives assessment in R-SEA, and identifying a ‘preferred’ PPP direction, was an 
issue of considerable debate.  The academic literature identifies alternatives as fundamental to R-
SEA (see Gunn and Noble 2009; Duinker and Grey 2007), but there was dissent as to the 
usefulness of, and approach to, alternatives for R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea - specifically 
scenario-based approaches.  There was no support for or against the use of alternatives 
assessment based on participant affiliation.  For example, one industry participant explained that 
strategic planning is useful with scenarios, noting that it “doesn’t have to be detailed per se, but 
can offer direction of how much development to permit and at what frequency.”  Similarly, an 
environmental consultant referred to the Norwegian and American regulatory regime, where 
cumulative impacts are examined before licensing, adding that in Canada, the practice has been 
to view each licensing call as a standalone exercise, and “we need to formalize the process, and 
look at the potential cumulative effects of licenses.”  A Fisheries and Oceans Canada regulator 
also saw the value in scenarios and explained: “if R-SEA could tell me where development needs 
to stop in terms of effects, that is the answer I need.” 
Others disagreed as to the usefulness and applicability of alternatives based assessment 
and the use of scenarios.  Some participants noted that identifying strategic alternatives or ways 
to proceed, for instance, scenario planning, staged development, or restrictions toward permitting 
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quotas, is not necessary in the Beaufort Sea given the lack of current development activity.  The 
“pace of development will occur naturally,” an environmental consultant participant expressed, 
“and will be determined, in part, by infrastructure capacity.”  Some industry participants were 
also sceptical, and concerned that entertaining alternative scenarios of development and 
conservation, including the scenario of ‘no development’, would not support their economic 
bottom line.  For example, one industry participant explained that: 
 
Industry is opposed to preferred scenarios because whose preferred scenario? 
Preferred scenario as an oil proponent is access to my resources.  The 
Inuvialuit’s preferred scenario is they get benefits with minimal impact.  How 
does a preferred scenario unite industry, Inuvialuit and government?  Preferred 
scenarios are polarizing, and latching onto a preferred development can end up 
killing a project.  
 
An ENGO participant added fodder to industry’s unease, noting: “it’s entirely possible that you 
could have policy on energy and environment side that could restrict the ability to develop 
resources.”   
When PPPs and strategic options are developed through R-SEA, results reveal the 
importance of accommodating the preferences and priorities of stakeholders.  Ensuring that risk 
and benefit debates take place, for instance, was posed by an Inuvialuit participant as an 
important issue in prioritizing regional PPPs and development strategies: “are there economic 
benefits for the Inuvialuit if development activities proceed, if so is it worth the trade-off for 
potential disruption of the ecosystem if there was an oil spill?”  Results also showed that industry 
goals require careful consideration so that R-SEA does not automatically foreclose development 
opportunities.  One participant from territorial government explained that “industry pay huge 
sums for rights and without industry there is no economic development and without a regulatory 
environment that supports industry then we fail to support a main element of Canada’s Northern 
Strategy, economic development.” It is important when identifying a strategic alternative for 
offshore development that there is the potential to deliver favorable results for industry.  An 
industry participant explained that sequencing development through a strategic planning process 
should be viewed in a positive fashion in that data could support more, as opposed to fewer 
wells.  
A final issue was assessing cumulative effects.  Some participants saw the potential to 
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address cumulative effects through R-SEA, and the uncertainty that characterizes the cumulative 
effects assessment of alternative futures as a positive attribute of R-SEA; others viewed the lack 
of concreteness around regional cumulative effects as a negative feature of R-SEA.  An industry 
participant explained that “there are so many approaches to assessing cumulative effects that it is 
confusing, and less than useful, even harmful to industry if the assessment isn’t carried out 
effectively with clearly established boundaries, funding and expertise.”  Consistent with the 
CCME’s (2009) view of R-SEA, some participants emphasized that long-term assessment 
horizons are characterized by vast uncertainties about change and external drivers and can lead to 
corresponding uncertainty about what effects are most likely to occur in the future.  Those in 
favour of R-SEA for cumulative effects assessment maintained that it must be stakeholder-based 
and a participatory process.  An industry participant added that “regional scale, with multi-
stakeholder participation, holds potential for cumulative effects assessment – a staple to 
success.”  Participants also identified various elements that required attention when approaching 
cumulative effects through R-SEA, including regional baseline data and the importance of 
considering the complexity of the cumulative effects issues and pathways in marine 
environments.  !
4.5.3 Post-Assessment Phase  
Follow-up and monitoring emerged as a key issue in the post-assessment phase, specifically 
regarding R-SEA’s added value to management and decision-making.  An Inuvialuit participant 
explained the value that could come from understanding the outcomes of decision-making 
through follow-up, not only as it pertains to R-SEA, but also by applying performance evaluation 
results to implementation targets of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement: “follow -up monitoring 
would be beneficial to offer land claim beneficiaries some tangible data on the effectiveness of 
mitigation and management actions.”  A significant shortcoming identified under current EA in 
the Beaufort Sea was the lack of follow-up and monitoring; as one industry participant 
explained, “regulatory agencies do not monitor very well – they don’t look at it from a larger 
regional perspective and it doesn’t go back into a planning process.”  A Joint Secretariat 
participant agreed, noting that monitoring is “more for the purposes of meeting regulatory 
requirements than fulfilling a practical purpose.”  Congruence in monitoring methods and data 
collection emerged as important to R-SEA, with industry’s project-specific monitoring efforts 
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able to provide a valuable contribution to the monitoring of VECs.  Consistent with the CCME 
(2009) it is necessary to ensure monitoring and data are quality controlled, transferable and 
comparable.  Failure to achieve congruence may lead to problems in comparing monitoring 
results.  As an ENGO participant explained: “if you allow proponents to form their own 
monitoring plan you get a mishmash of data with different methodologies that makes obtaining a 
coherent picture challenging.  Make sure the monitoring plan is well defined for the proponent so 
the data received is comparable and can be used to inform a regional picture.”   
Finally, participants identified the need for an adaptive approach to implementation.  An 
industry participant expanded on the need for flexible and adaptable implementation: 
 
Dealing with so many uncertainties we need to reserve flexibility to adjust as 
development unfolds.  R-SEA model might be the best thing in the world, but it 
could be useless in affecting change if it cannot accommodate public opinion 
and values.  When dealing with so many uncertainties with regard to how the 
offshore will develop, it must be modifiable. 
 
An ENGO participant added that it must demonstrate that the views of the affected public are 
taken seriously and integrated, where possible, in the final design of the strategic alternative, and 
“it has to be a living document informed by public opinion, so that the outcomes are reflected by 
inputs.”  The importance of implementing R-SEA as an iterative and adaptive process was 
deemed as core to R-SEA’s success, particularly when it comes to VECs and having “a system 
built in for ensuring VECs are validated regularly, as values change over time.” 
 
4.6 Discussion: Advancing R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea  
There are several issues and challenges that need to be addressed to advance R-SEA in the 
Beaufort Sea; yet there appears to be a foundation from which to move forward.  The goal of this 
paper was to identify key issues and gaps that may pose challenges or opportunities for R-SEA 
implementation in the Beaufort Sea.  What follows are a number observations concerning R-SEA 
implementation.  Although based on Canada’s western Arctic, the lessons and observations are 
relevant to other national and international offshore jurisdictions.  
 
4.6.1 Diversity of Expectations  
Diversity in expectations of what R-SEA is expected to address and deliver in the Beaufort Sea is 
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a challenge to its development and implementation, particularly when attempting to establish a 
reference framework.  Though most expectations of what R-SEA should accomplish in the 
Beaufort Sea were consistent with what R-SEA can potentially deliver (see CCME 2009), results 
reinforce the work of Noble et al. (2013), Ketilson (2011) and Vicenté and Partidário (2006) who 
respectively observed that R-SEA’s role, particularly in energy sector PPP development and 
assessment, is neither well developed nor understood, and hence the nature of R-SEA remains 
unclear to many. 
Part of the challenge may be attributed to the flexibility of R-SEA as an approach to 
planning and assessment.  Although some have argued that structure and consistency is core to 
strategic approaches (Fischer 2003), others like Partidário (2000), Nilsson and Dalkmann (2001) 
and the CCME (2009) maintain that SEA-based initiatives must be flexible to regional and local 
context.  In the Beaufort Sea, flexibility proved to be a desirable characteristic of R-SEA; 
however, a challenge associated with flexibility was the establishment of clear purpose and scope 
for R-SEA and reaching agreement on the specific questions and problems to be addressed. 
Failure to agree on the scope of R-SEA early on in the process poses a major impediment to its 
adoption, implementation and ultimate effectiveness.  
Poor understanding of, or disregard for, context can lead to simplified judgments about 
resource systems, and consequently failures in management efforts (Bina 2008a).  To ensure that 
R-SEA can emerge as an accepted and worthwhile part of planning and decision-making 
processes, constraints and intent need to be agreed upon at the outset and made clear to all 
interested parties (see Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005).  This is currently not the case in the 
Beaufort Sea.  The diversity of expectations reinforce Dalal-Clayton and Sadler’s (2005) 
findings that R-SEA needs to be better understood if it is to be welcomed into decision-making 
for resource planning and development.  However, notwithstanding the variety of opinions on 
what R-SEA should do in the Beaufort Sea, there was consensus that something needs to be done 
and that the current project-based approach is not sufficient. 
 
4.6.2 Scepticism and Resistance about a Futures-based Approach 
Notwithstanding increasing calls for R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea, there remains scepticism and 
resistance, albeit by the minority, that R-SEA will not be a fair process for all stakeholders and 
certain procedural benefits, such as establishing regional targets and thresholds, may have 
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adverse impacts for industry.  Resistance to R-SEA implementation was rooted in one of the 
most fundamental components of R-SEA, that of examining alternative futures (see CCME 
2009; Jones et al. 2005) and selecting a strategic course of action.  Particular scepticism emerged 
regarding the need for scenario planning given the lack of current offshore energy activity in the 
region; suggesting limited understanding of the purpose of R-SEA and the role of scenarios in 
planning and assessment.  This was not surprising. Duinker and Greig (2007) report that, 
although scenario-based approaches are most appropriate to the task of planning for and 
assessing the impacts of future development, they are significantly underutilized and promoted in 
EA practice.  Scenario-based approaches are about examining ‘what may happen,’ ‘what is most 
likely to happen,’ and ‘what would we prefer to happen’ concerning the development and 
outcomes of development in a particular region (see Rubin and Kaivo-oja 1999).  In a region 
characterized by much uncertainty concerning the future impacts of offshore resource 
development, as noted by interview participants, scenario-based analysis is ideally suited for 
grappling with such uncertainties and a shift away “from trying to estimate what is most likely to 
occur toward questions of what are the consequences and most appropriate responses under 
different circumstances” (Duinker and Greig 2007: 209).  Interestingly, the consideration of 
strategic alternatives early in decision-making, before irreversible development decisions are 
taken, was an opportunity and potential benefit of R-SEA that most Inuvialuit participants 
supported.  However, among those who accepted the need for scenario use and evaluation in the 
Beaufort, there were many different opinions on what scenarios should be considered and what 
they would be willing to accept - ranging from seismic free areas to energy policy on renewable 
versus non-renewable energy futures. 
 
4.6.3 Understanding Stakeholder Resistance and Scepticism  
Resistance and scepticism regarding alternative assessments and scenario based approaches may 
be a result of the perceived risk of being locked into a PPP that is seen as ‘less than desirable’ for 
any individual interest.  This was a particular concern raised by industry; however, more 
attention is needed to understanding stakeholder resistance to address the root cause of this 
perception.  Such scepticism could stem from fear of legislation of R-SEA outputs, or the lack of 
flexibility for industry to plan for and control its future as it has had the liberty to do to date in 
the Beaufort.  The level of disdain regarding the current regulatory system by industry 
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participants is not improving.  Erlandson (2009) argues that the problem with northern regulatory 
systems is not that they are complex, but that they don’t work in relation to the business cycle for 
oil and gas development.  Erlandson (2009:419) further reports that operators in the petroleum 
sector “can’t count on standards of administrative law such as consistency, predictability and 
timeliness that are taken for granted elsewhere,” and their perceptions of risk have risen over the 
last 10 years.  Such stark findings illustrate deeply rooted public policy problems that have been 
well documented by others (see Abele 2009; McCrank 2008), which have lead in part to 
cynicism on behalf of industry on the government’s ability to effectively and efficiently manage 
the offshore environment.  In this way, industry seemed skeptical not of change per se, but rather 
the government’s capacity to effectively carry out and implement an R-SEA.  
Vicente and Partidário (2006) argue that such perceptions are influenced by individual 
cultural and social contexts, including past experience, and that understanding the root of the 
problem and the different perceptions of a problem lie at the core of SEA activities.  Ultimately, 
however, if no PPP direction is identified, then R-SEA is no more than a data collection exercise 
with little value added to development assessment and decision-making (see CAPP 2009) and, 
arguably, no different than past efforts in the Beaufort region.  If there is a lack of commitment 
to identifying and charting a course in the western Arctic through R-SEA, then perhaps R-SEA is 
not the right tool.  On the other hand, if there is a lack of commitment from certain stakeholders, 
as is the case in the Beaufort, then perhaps there is a need for better education regarding R-SEA.  
This could be accomplished through, for example, empirical case study learning from other 
offshore jurisdictions to demonstrate that R-SEA does not arrive at polarizing decisions, nor is it 
a command and control type process (see Knol 2010; Hasle et al. 2009).  Instead, it is a means of 
integrating environmental and broader sustainability considerations in regional PPPs.  There is a 
need to bring forward evidence from case applications that R-SEA can achieve its objectives 
without adding significant delays to regulatory and decision-making processes.  Nevertheless, if 
industry is fundamentally opposed to R-SEA this will pose a significant challenge to 
implementation.  This is particularly the case given the current national political climate that is 
driving energy investment as a result of Prime Minister Harper’s commitment for Canada to be 
an energy superpower (see Hester 2007), and the relaxing of federal environmental assessment 
laws and regulations to promote more rapid exploration, development and approval processes 
(see Gibson 2012). 
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4.6.4 Good Governance 
R-SEA can help advance good regional governance for resource planning and assessment, as 
intended by the CCME (2009), but there was concern by some participants that R-SEA would 
simply be another layer of government.  Scott (2008) maintains that SEA’s contribution to good 
governance has been made without examination of the tensions inherent within good governance 
discourse, and that the SEA-good governance nexus is more an objective than a reality.  In other 
words, R-SEA can help advance good governance, but its success in doing so is largely 
dependent on the extent to which stakeholders are engaged and able to participate in and 
influence decision-making.  This kind of circumspect thinking emerged in the results, as some 
participants saw R-SEA adding another layer of bureaucracy with no guaranteed benefits.  For 
some Inuvialuit participants, there was concern that R-SEA could be a process dictated at the 
federal level, eroding decision-making power and influence within the Inuvialuit Settlement 
Region.  This perceived risk of loss of control was exacerbated by concerns over the possibility 
of industry leading R-SEA initiatives, and playing a key role in the environmental management 
of the region. Despite these concerns, there was broad agreement that government should play a 
lead role in R-SEA through a multi-stakeholder approach.  
The OECD (2006: 46) reports that “SEA supports good governance by: encouraging 
stakeholder participation ... [and] Increasing transparency and accountability’ as well as 
‘clarifying institutional responsibilities.’”  The increased transparency afforded by SEA at the 
regional level can be a potential catalyst for increased efforts at joined-up government through 
“increas[ing] pressures to overcome bureaucratic fragmentation and jurisdictional conflict”, 
according to Stinchcombe and Gibson (2001: 354) in Scott (2008).  The Inuvialuit have been 
active participants in multi-stakeholder government processes to improve and prepare for 
offshore development for decades (see CAPP 2009).  In this way, existing multi-stakeholder 
initiatives such as the IOMP, BREA and IRIS may help set a foundation or establish pre-
conditions for R-SEA success.  As laudable as these initiatives have been, however, ubiquitous 
governance challenges prevail (see Erlandson 2009), which from the Inuvialuit perspective 
comes from the “requirements of legislation and institutions, mainly federal, that are layered on 
top of those of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, and which were not designed to be coordinated 
with each other” – or even complimentary (Cournoyea 2009: 391).  Fundamental governance and 
coordination challenges such as these may be addressed in part through R-SEA; however, given 
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their legislative depth they will likely continue to challenge offshore planning and management 
efforts and be a significant challenge to R-SEA implementation.   
 
4.6.5 Social Impacts  
Results support Norman’s (2005) findings that the well-being of coastal communities should be 
paramount in marine resource development, and there is a need for R-SEA to focus on the 
onshore socioeconomic implications of offshore development.  Porta and Bankes (2011) echo the 
concern that many Inuvialuit participants raised regarding risks and benefits: “of all the players 
involved in an Arctic offshore oil and gas program, Inuit communities bear the greatest risk, and 
with the current system benefits are not proportionate to these risks.”  Oil and gas investments 
can have significant positive local, and in the case of major projects, regional and national 
economic impacts; however, extractive industry investments can also give rise to a range of 
negative effects (Wagner and Armstrong 2010).  The potential negative effects of resource 
extraction proved to be a major concern for participants, especially the Inuvialuit.  
Benefit plans emerged as a contentious topic; the seabed where offshore drilling occurs is 
Crown land but unlike for onshore arrangements industry is not legally obliged in the offshore to 
establish impact and benefit agreements.  Porta and Bankes (2011) maintain that the absence of a 
legal trigger to negotiate benefit agreements for offshore production fails to balance the risks and 
benefits of those operations for local communities.  There is an opportunity for R-SEA to 
integrate socioeconomic considerations early in the planning of offshore oil and gas systems 
(CCME 2009), and, R-SEA could potentially integrate benefit agreements into the assessment 
process and offer decision makers and local interests a better understanding of the broader 
development planning cycle.  This could enable an evaluation of how such agreements contribute 
to the region and maximize economic benefits, prior to specific project-based negotiations, and 
whether they support regional goals and R-SEA objectives.  The roles of these two potentially 
complementary processes, R-SEA and negotiated benefit agreements, in contributing toward 
more informed decision-making requires further examination.  To date, the focus on research on 
benefit agreements in relation to environmental management has focused exclusively on project-
level EA, namely in the mineral sector (see Noble and Fidler 2011), and suggest that such 
agreements have emerged, in part, due to the inadequacies of project-based assessments in 
addressing cumulative effects, socioeconomic impacts and follow-up (Galbraith et al. 2007).  It 
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may well be the case that such agreements need to remain outside the scope of R-SEA, but in the 
context of impact management and Arctic offshore planning the current system requires reform 
(Doelle et al. 2012).  Cournoyea (2009: 392) argues that while the Inuvialuit are adaptable 
people, it is the federal government’s responsibility to invest in public services such as health, 
and social services, concluding that “if the only investment in capacity is in reaction to 
development after the fact, it will come too late.”  !
4.6.6 Post-Assessment and Implementation 
Overall participants had much more to say, and raised many more concerns, regarding the pre-
assessment and assessment phases of R-SEA than they did about implementation and post-
implementation evaluation of the PPPs that emerge from R-SEA.  Although the lack of follow-
up and monitoring under EA (see Morrison-Saunders and Arts 2004; Arts et al. 2005) was raised 
by study participants, relatively little comment was made regarding what comes after R-SEA, 
when a PPP or course of action is identified.  This is not surprising, as Gachechiladze et al. 
(2009) report that most SEA research and practice has focused almost exclusively on pre-
decision stages, in particular the development and application of SEA systems and 
methodological frameworks, with limited attention to the post decision follow-up stage.  With 
limited attention to monitoring for undesirable effects during the PPP’s implementation, it will 
prove difficult to draw conclusions on planning assumptions and apply these to subsequent 
assessments (see Cherp et al. 2007).  The lack of consideration to post implementation is 
particularly concerning given the noted uncertainties associated with development in the offshore 
region.  
The necessary supporting institutional environments to ensure that a preferred strategy 
can succeed, or that management actions are in place in order for a preferred strategy to be 
considered viable, remains underdeveloped both in the academic literature  (Gachechiladzeis et 
al. 2009) and in practice.  Problematic in this regard, and consistent with Noble (2003), is that R-
SEA output and decision outcomes are to a significant extent a function of the input and quality 
of the R-SEA process.  If institutional arrangements to support the implementation of R-SEA 
output have not been considered during the entire R-SEA process, efforts performed in the pre-
assessment and assessment phase could prove futile.  The result is an R-SEA process that 
resembles no more than a visioning and data collection exercise but with no implementation or 
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links to decision-making.  Shannon (1998) maintains that institutional arrangements are just as 
important as the scientific and technical aspects of understanding and conducting assessments, as 
they establish a template for patterns of relationships and administrative mechanisms to manage 
effects.  Although partnerships exist in the Beaufort Sea through various multi-stakeholder 
programs and initiatives, no research on the network of institutional arrangements has been 
conducted to establish whether existing arrangement can support R-SEA implementation.  There 
is a documented need to better understand the ways in which institutional arrangements affect the 
advancement and implementation of R-SEA. Even the most well intended strategies are of little 
value if they are not put into action (CCME 2009).  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Large-scale offshore hydrocarbon development is looming in the Canadian Beaufort Sea, but 
there is no R-SEA framework to help plan for future energy development, establish a long-term 
regional vision, or to assess and effectively manage potential cumulative effects.  A majority of 
stakeholders have advocated for R-SEA in the Beaufort (e.g., Arctic Council 2009; IGC 2004), 
and there is optimism that a foundation exists through the application of the CCME R-SEA 
model to guide and advance offshore planning and assessment.  This paper set out to identify key 
opportunities for and challenges to the implementation of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea, and in 
doing so examined support for its implementation and identified areas of stakeholder 
disagreement.  Although acute implementation challenges were identified, such as issues of 
governance and the nature and scope of alternatives assessment, findings reveal particular 
challenges to the current project EA approach and show that R-SEA offers a much needed 
framework to begin addressing stakeholder concerns about future offshore development in the 
region.  The CCME framework provides a starting point to advance R-SEA in Canada’s western 
Arctic and ensure that offshore development in the region reflects the intended and desirable 
outcomes of stakeholders, as opposed to the most likely ones. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
The shift from managing individual projects to more regional and integrative approaches has 
begun to take root internationally in environmental management.  The interest in regionally-
based, strategic approaches to EA stems from the limited capacity of project-based EA to address 
cumulative effects and alternatives (Harriman Gunn and Noble 2009a), the desire of public and 
indigenous groups to be more involved in development planning (Porta and Bankes 2011), the 
need to integrate sustainability considerations at the early stages of development through PPPs 
(Harriman and Noble 2008), and recognition that development decisions should be set within a 
broader environmental planning and management framework (CCME 2009; Partidário 2000).  
As a result, there is now a collective understanding that EA must go beyond the evaluation of 
site-specific project impacts to consider the broader policy and regional planning context in 
which development projects operate (Elvin and Fraser 2012; Noble and Harriman 2008; WWF 
2005; Partidário 2000).  
The widespread international adoption of SEA is linked intrinsically to an increased 
understanding of the relationship between development and environment (Fundingsland Tetlow 
and Hanusch 2012).  Recognition that biophysical systems cannot be viewed or managed in 
isolation to human systems, and that these systems must be managed in an interconnected and 
adaptable manner is well documented in environmental governance literature (see Plummer and 
Armitage 2007; Adger et al. 2005; Berkes et al. 2003).  The need for a strategic approach to EA 
is recognized especially in the context of offshore hydrocarbon planning and development (see 
BSStRPA 2008; Horvath and Barnes, 2004; Davey et al. 2000; Kinn 1999) where projects 
operate in a large infrastructure network and the risks to marine environments are often high on a 
global scale (Campagna et al. 2011; Wagner and Armstrong 2010).  By their very nature, such 
projects require regional and strategic coordination (Spiridonov 2006; WWF 2005; Salter and 
Ford 2001).  There are now various forms of SEA for offshore energy planning and impact 
assessment ongoing internationally (see Hasle et al. 2009; Wagner and Jones 2004); yet, in 
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Canada's western Arctic, an emerging energy frontier, planning for offshore hydrocarbon 
development continues to occur on a project-by-project basis (Doelle et al. 2012; Voutier et al. 
2008). 
The absence of a strategic approach to environmental planning and assessment in the 
Beaufort Sea continues to raise many questions concerning Canada’s preparedness for offshore 
energy development (Doelle et al. 2012; Porta and Bankes 2011; WWF 2005).  Concerns exist 
over the ability of current project-driven assessment to address the long-term cumulative 
environmental and social impacts of offshore development on the marine environment and local 
communities (see Arctic Council 2009; Doelle et al. 2012).  Notwithstanding several regional 
planning, baseline collection and science-based marine initiatives ongoing in Canada’s western 
Arctic (e.g., IOMP, BREA, IRIS), and recognition at the national (e.g., CCME 2009) and 
international levels (e.g., Arctic Council 2009) of the importance of a strategic approach, there 
remains no consolidated framework of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea. Questions over whether and 
how such a framework can or should be implemented remain unaddressed. 
Part of the challenge to implementation of R-SEA in general is that the majority of 
research attention on the subject has focused on demonstrating the need for and benefits of such 
a framework (see Bina 2007), rather than on examining implementation issues to advance R-
SEA from a novel concept to applied planning, assessment and decision support process.  This 
research examined how an R-SEA framework could be used in the Beaufort Sea to influence 
planning and development decisions in a broad, regional socioeconomic and environmental 
context.  Specifically, through identifying key implementation challenges and opportunities 
based on stakeholder perceptions, this research advanced a greater understanding of how to 
advance R-SEA principles and frameworks to inform and improve the efficacy of environmental 
management and decision-making. The specific objectives of the research were to:  
i. examine offshore SEA frameworks internationally to identify operational challenges and 
opportunities and their influence on oil and gas planning and decision-making; 
ii. identify stakeholder perceptions regarding challenges and opportunities of current marine 
planning, assessment and science initiatives in Canada’s western Arctic to ascertain 
whether and how these initiatives enable horizontal and vertical integration and 
effectively facilitate marine resource planning and decision-making; and 
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iii. identify key opportunities for, and challenges to, implementation of R-SEA in the 
Beaufort Sea based on a normative model and stakeholder expectations of R-SEA. 
 
5.2 Key Findings 
The first manuscript, “Advancing strategic environmental assessment in the offshore oil and gas 
sector: Lessons from Norway, Canada, and the United Kingdom” (Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review, 2012, 34: 12-21), set out to examine the efficacy of SEA offshore, in 
particular its influence on planning and development decisions.  Based on the need for a better 
understanding of the nature and efficacy of SEA in the offshore energy sector and its role in 
planning and development decisions (Jay 2010), the findings are important to informing 
emerging energy frontiers, such as Canada's western Arctic, where there is an articulated need 
and interest to advance R-SEA (see Doelle et al. 2012; Elvin and Fraser 2012; Arctic Council, 
2009; WWF 2005).  The three international offshore SEA systems were reviewed by examining 
regulations and impact assessment and planning reports, complemented by 20 semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners, regulators, industry representatives, and NGOs directly involved in 
SEA offshore in Norway, Atlantic Canada and the United Kingdom.  Each offshore system was 
examined based on a set of normative criteria derived from the SEA evaluation literature (see 
Gunn and Noble 2011; Noble 2009; Fischer and Gazzola 2006; Jones et al. 2005).  
The results revealed seven key findings. First, in terms of normative versus applied SEA, 
the purpose and deliverables of SEA in the offshore environment often differ and were much 
more restrictive than the ambitious expectations about SEA identified in the academic literature.  
Second, though early application of SEA, prior to offshore license issuance, is considered ideal 
and most influential in directing planning and development decisions, there is still merit to SEA 
coming late in the offshore planning process, post license issuance, even though certain options 
for planning and development may be foreclosed.  Third, alternatives assessment is identified as 
core to effective SEA (see Fischer 2007; Noble and Storey 2001), but the nature of alternatives 
considered in each of the three offshore systems examined was inherently restrictive when 
compared to academic expectation about the range of alternatives that should be considered in 
SEA, including ‘no development’ alternatives; this was, in part, a reflection of the timing of SEA 
application in the policy and planning process.  Fourth, each jurisdiction recognized the 
importance of public participation in SEA processes, reinforcing SEA's communicative potential 
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as a means to influence decisions (see Runhaar and Driessen 2007), but the offshore ‘out of 
sight, out of mind’ nature of the industry proved problematic in some cases in sustaining public 
engagement.  Fifth, socioeconomic issues received relatively limited attention in each of the 
three offshore systems reviewed in comparison to biophysical considerations, particularly the 
onshore socioeconomic impacts associated with offshore development.  Sixth, the potential for 
SEA as a tool to assess cumulative effects is well argued, but the benefits have yet to be clearly 
demonstrated in offshore practice due, in part, to agencies responsible for development having 
neither the authority nor capacity to address multi-sectoral cumulative effects.  Finally, although 
tiering is considered by many to be a major driver of SEA (see Fischer 2007; João 2005), the 
tiered forward benefits and influence of SEA were not fully realized in the three cases examined. 
SEA appeared to have only limited, direct influence on subsequent levels or tiers of planning and 
assessment due in large part to a lack of clear coordination between higher and lower tiers.  
Overall, the manuscript demonstrated how SEA informs and improves the efficacy and 
efficiency of project-based assessment offshore; however, it also demonstrated how weak 
coordination between higher and lower tiers limits SEA's ability to influence planning and 
development decisions in a broad regional environmental and socioeconomic context.  The 
lessons and challenges that emerged from the three cases transcend their specific regional 
offshore context, and therefore provide transferable learning for the Beaufort Sea and other 
offshore areas.   
The second manuscript, “Stakeholder Perceptions of Current Planning, Assessment and 
Science Initiatives in Canada’s Beaufort Sea” (Arctic, accepted for publication), examined how 
existing initiatives facilitate a more coordinated and informed approach to planning, assessment 
and decision-making for sustainable offshore development.  The objective was to understand 
stakeholder perceptions regarding the challenges and opportunities of current marine planning, 
assessment and science initiatives in Canada’s western Arctic, thus providing an assessment of 
the current policy and planning landscape in the context of resource development.  The IOMP, 
BREA and IRIS initiatives were reviewed using desk-based analysis of research reports and 
policy and planning documents, supplemented by 50 semi-structured interviews with Inuvialuit 
co-management boards and agencies, municipal government, territorial and federal government, 
oil and gas industry, private consultants, and ENGOs and other energy interest groups.  Interview 
participants were selected based on their experience in and knowledge of offshore oil and gas 
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development, planning and decision-making in the Beaufort Sea. 
Results demonstrated three key issues that are essential to the efficacy of current 
initiatives in support of a more coordinated, regional approach to marine resource planning and 
management in relation to offshore development in the Beaufort Sea.  These include horizontal 
integration between management bodies, vertical tiering from the strategic level and regional 
scale to the operational level and project scale, and the establishment of an overarching vision for 
regional planning and development in the Beaufort Sea.  Results also demonstrated the need for a 
more integrative and strategic planning and assessment framework in the Beaufort Sea – a 
framework to coordinate current initiatives, combine data for planning and assessment, and set 
strategic priorities for the future management and development of the region.  Such a framework 
is beyond the collective abilities of current offshore planning and management initiatives in the 
Beaufort Sea, but is consistent with R-SEA, which focuses on identifying possible future 
scenarios and sustainable regional outcomes (Harriman Gunn and Noble 2009a) rather than on 
mitigating the outcomes of decisions already taken under a project-based EA scenario (Noble 
2009; Marshall and Fischer 2006). 
The final manuscript, “Advancing Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment in 
Canada’s Western Arctic: Implementation Opportunities and Challenges” (Journal of 
Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, 2013, 15: 1) identified key opportunities 
for, and challenges to, the implementation of R-SEA.  There has been much interest in R-SEA, 
and a growing body of research on the benefits and opportunities of strategic approaches to EA, 
but very little attention on implementation.  The current Beaufort Sea planning, assessment and 
decision-making environment was examined against the normative CCME (2009) model and 
expectations of R-SEA, with the intent of providing a foundation for advancing R-SEA from 
concept to practice.  50 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Inuvialuit co-
management boards and agencies, municipal government, territorial and federal government, oil 
and gas industry, private consultants, and ENGOs and other energy interest groups.  Interview 
participants were selected based on their experience in and knowledge of offshore oil and gas 
development, planning and decision-making.  The purpose was to examine current stakeholder 
support for R-SEA implementation for offshore planning and management and areas of potential 
disagreement amongst stakeholders. 
The results indicate that there are a number of issues and challenges that need to be 
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addressed in order to advance R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea, but there is also a considerable 
foundation already in place.  In terms of challenges for R-SEA implementation in the Beaufort 
Sea, several key issues emerged.  First, the diversity in expectations of what R-SEA is expected 
to address and deliver in the Beaufort Sea was identified as a key challenge to its development 
and implementation, particularly when attempting to establish a reference framework for R-SEA 
design, purpose and objectives.  Second, there was scepticism and resistance, albeit by the 
minority of participants, regarding the assessment of alternative futures through R-SEA and 
selecting a preferred strategic course of action and the implications, which from an industry 
perspective could be restrictive.  Third, and closely related to this, there emerged a need to better 
understand stakeholder resistance in order to address the root cause of scepticism.  Some 
participants, for example, were concerned that R-SEA would simply add another layer of 
government regulation with no guaranteed benefits to planning or decision-making, indicating 
that more research is necessary on the topic of R-SEA and good governance in order to ensure its 
effective implementation.  Fourth, in terms of social impact planning and management, further 
efforts are required to address onshore impacts at a broader regional level and ensure benefits are 
proportionate to risks.  Finally, although results showed that stakeholders had given some 
consideration to, and expressed concerns about, R-SEA process, design, data and alternatives 
assessment, there has been very little consideration given to post-implementation evaluation of 
R-SEA.  This is particularly concerning given the noted uncertainties associated with 
development in the offshore region.  Overall, this manuscript showed that a foundation exists 
through the application of the CCME R-SEA model to guide and advance offshore planning and 
assessment in the region.  Although acute implementation challenges were identified, findings 
reinforce that the current regulatory regime is not sufficient and R-SEA does offer a much 
needed framework to accommodate and begin addressing stakeholder issues and concerns about 
future offshore development in the region. 
 
5.3 Lessons from Practice for Advancing R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea 
This research identified both opportunities and challenges to advancing R-SEA in the Beaufort 
Sea.  The following sections step back from the specific results of each manuscript and focus on 
three overarching challenges that must be addressed if R-SEA is to become an accepted, 
worthwhile, and effective planning, assessment and decision support process in Canada’s 
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western Arctic. 
 
5.3.1 Context Sensitivity and Managing Expectations 
Bina (2007) suggests there has been systematic growth of expectations attached to SEA. 
Certainly in the case of the Beaufort Sea there were many expectations of what R-SEA could 
deliver, and a diversity of expectations resulting from the varied stakeholder priorities, values 
and goals.  This variety illustrates the diverse political, economic and cultural context of the 
region, which has, in part, resulted in skepticism about and resistance to R-SEA in the Beaufort 
Sea.  It was argued by some that R-SEA would not be a fair process for all stakeholders in the 
region and that certain planning and decision-support benefits of R-SEA, such as establishing 
regional targets and thresholds for development, would have potentially adverse impacts for 
industry.  Stakeholder resistance and scepticism regarding alternative assessments in R-SEA and 
the use of scenario based approaches appeared to be a result of the perceived risk of being 
locked-in to a PPP that may be ‘less than desirable’ for any individual interest.  This perception, 
while potentially realistic depending on a stakeholders’ initial expectations, is arguably too 
focused on the possible negative outcomes of the findings of an R-SEA and fails to adequately 
consider possible benefits, such as increased certainty with respect to the magnitude, location 
and/or timing of development.  Vicenté and Partidário (2006) argue that perceptions are 
influenced by individual cultural and social contexts, including past experience.  Understanding 
the root of the different perceptions of R-SEA thus lies at the core of advancing it as a viable tool 
in the Arctic.  
There are two contrasting approaches for addressing this diversity of expectations.  Some 
have argued that structure and consistency is core to strategic assessment approaches (Fischer 
2003); others such as Partidário (2000), Nilsson and Dalkmann (2001) and the CCME (2009) 
maintain that SEA-based initiatives must be flexible to regional and local context.  The need for 
R-SEA to be sensitive and accommodating to regional context, is consistent with Howitt (2001) 
who noted that resource localities are not asocial, apolitical or ahistorical, and thus resource 
management, conceived here as R-SEA, can benefit from learning from international offshore 
regimes (see Chapter 2) but more importantly must be context sensitive (Hilding-Rydevik and 
Bjarnadóttir 2007).  In this way the role and aims of R-SEA vary according to the planning and 
decision-making context in which it is applied (Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch 2012).  Based 
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on the current challenges and opportunities associated with the current IOMP, BREA and IRIS 
initiatives in the Beaufort, as identified in this thesis, it can be concluded that an approach 
situated between the two spectrums (i.e., structured and flexible) is appropriate.  Implementation 
challenges identified in the IOMP, for instance, were attributed to the initiative being too 
cumbersome and unfocused, in part a result of trying to accommodate too many issues.  While 
many participants upheld the value of a flexible and adaptable R-SEA model, challenges related 
to a lack of structure and consistency in the IOMP demonstrated that too much flexibility can 
have negative implications on implementation.  
Although challenging, acknowledging complexity and regional context will be critical to 
successful implementation of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea (see also Elvin and Fraser 2012; Abele 
2009).  Like many circumpolar indigenous populations, the Inuvialuit are faced with formidable 
challenges that are intimately tied to climate change, resource development and geopolitical 
transformations (Irlbacher-Fox and Mills 2009; Van Loon 2009).  The precise way in which 
Arctic ecosystems will respond to climate change and other stressors remains unknown (Prowse 
et al. 2009).  Normative SEA literature, best practice SEA case studies, evaluative criteria, and so 
forth all provide valuable information toward the development and application of R-SEA 
methodology and processes.  However, equally important, particularly in this regard, is creating 
a framework that reflects and respects the governance arrangements, such as the IFA and its 
environmental and wildlife co-management institutions, and the fragility of Arctic ecosystems.  
 
5.3.2 Implementation and Follow-up 
Most SEA research and practice has focused almost exclusively on pre-decision stages, in 
particular the development and application of SEA systems and methodological frameworks, 
with limited attention to the post decision follow-up stage (Gachechiladze et al. 2009; Partidário 
and Arts 2005; WWF 2005).  In the Beaufort Sea, participants generally had much more to say, 
and raised many more concerns regarding the pre-assessment and assessment phases of R-SEA 
than they did about the actual implementation and post-implementation evaluation of the PPPs 
that emerge from R-SEA.  Even though the lack of follow up and monitoring under current 
project-based EA (see Morrison-Saunders and Arts 2004; Arts et al. 2005) was consistently 
raised as problematic by study participants, relatively little was said regarding what comes after 
R-SEA, when a PPP or course of action is identified.  
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The thesis results further suggest that if R-SEA follow-up is to contribute to a better 
understanding of regional or cumulative environmental effects, then follow-up programs must 
pay greater attention to horizontal linkages between SEA strategies and current initiatives so that 
monitoring and reporting systems can be shared, where appropriate (see Gachechiladze et al. 
2009).  In international case studies (see Chapter 2) and in the Beaufort, the common finding was 
an assumption that the data and information generated at a strategic regional level would be 
useful to lower level assessment and decision-making processes, including project-based EA; 
however, in many cases there was limited attention given to the process of integration between 
high-level policies and on-the-ground decision-making.  This may be problematic in the Beaufort 
Sea, as in other jurisdictions, as PPPs are often formulated in abstract terms, resulting in vague 
directions for acting.  The international case studies presented in Chapter 2 indicate that if there 
is no concerted tiering of regional decisions or information downstream to where decisions and 
actions are taken about physical development in the offshore, then the influence of higher level 
efforts may be trivial.  While there is the potential for strategic initiatives to support lower level 
decision-making, the critical information required at the project level needs to be identified and a 
mechanism created whereby the data generated are collated and translated into a usable format 
for project assessments (Noble 2003).  
Consistent with Sanchez and Silva Sanchez (2008), the notion of tiering pervades the 
SEA literature but has received limited critical attention in real applications.  This thesis suggests 
that many of the disappointments regarding tiering and downstream influence are a result of 
inadequately linking the pre-assessment and assessment R-SEA stages to post-assessment and 
implementation.  There is an opportunity to learn from implementation deficiencies seen in other 
sectors and case studies (e.g., Gachechiladze et al. 2009), and the challenges related to tiering in 
the offshore environment (Chapter 2), and move beyond the basic recognition that follow-up and 
post-implementation activities must be done  (see CCME 2009) toward developing the 
governance frameworks, principles and good practice guidance needed to advance follow-up in 
R-SEA from concept to actual practice. 
There currently exists a significant amount of information related to the Beaufort Sea, but 
this exists in a variety of sources and formats.  An R-SEA deliverable should therefore entail an 
information management portal that expands upon, or links to, existing tools such as the Arctic 
Institute of North America’s ASTIS database and AANDC’s Petroleum and Environment 
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Management Tool.  The overall objective would be to minimize duplication of effort and 
facilitate regulatory processes by providing a specific entry point for the delivery and 
dissemination of relevant information.  
 
5.3.3 Governance: Horizontal Integration and Cooperation 
Scott (2008) maintains that SEA’s contribution to good governance has been made without 
examination of the tensions inherent within good governance discourse, and that the SEA-good 
governance nexus is more an objective than a reality.  In part, the thesis findings (see Chapter 4) 
support this statement, as there is no guarantee that R-SEA will lead to good governance if the 
appropriate steps are not taken to determine which parties and partnerships have the capacity to 
carry out R-SEA and implement the results.  In the Beaufort Sea there was concern amongst 
some stakeholders that R-SEA could add considerable regulatory complexity and even erode the 
decision-making power and influence of the Inuvialuit if R-SEA was nationally-driven, or the 
decision-making power and influence of the federal government if R-SEA was inherently 
regional-driven.  
Institutional arrangements have challenged previous and current initiatives in the 
Beaufort Sea (e.g., IOMP, BREA), by what Jessen (2011) describes as ‘federal silos’ that impede 
horizontal coordination.  According to Stinchcombe and Gibson (2001: 354), the increased 
transparency afforded by SEA at the regional level can be a potential catalyst for “increased 
efforts at joined-up government through ‘increas[ed] pressures to overcome bureaucratic 
fragmentation and jurisdictional conflict”.  A federally led R-SEA has the potential to support 
Erlandson’s (2009: 421) call for “greater coordination, at a senior level, across all federal 
departments and agencies involved in resource management and decision-making”.  Increased 
coordination and collaboration between federal departments would be beneficial, but must 
simultaneously maintain the influence and decision-making power of the Inuvialuit.  While there 
is potential for R-SEA to advance good governance (see OECD 2006), its ability to do so is not a 
foregone conclusion and is largely dependent on horizontal coordination and cooperation, and 
the degree to which stakeholders may influence decision-making. 
Closely related to PPP implementation, it is necessary that supporting institutional 
arrangements are in place to ensure that any preferred strategy can succeed, or that management 
actions are in place for a preferred strategy to be considered viable.  Sheelanere et al. (2013) 
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argue that the major challenge in scaling up from the project scale to the regional scale in EA lies 
not only in understanding a broader range of ecological interactions, but also in negotiating the 
additional institutional and management complexity involved in broader, more regionally 
focused planning and management processes.  Institutional coordination and support for regional 
and strategic EA, however, remains relatively underdeveloped in the academic literature 
(Gachechiladze et al. 2009).  Consistent with Slootweg and Jones (2011) and Jiliberto (2011) 
more emphasis is needed on governance, institutions and the level of management needed with 
regard to the ability, commitment and preparedness to implement and manage R-SEA systems.  
The results of this thesis illuminate tensions between science and sociopolitical factors in 
the Beaufort Sea, which are supported by Murawski (2007) who maintains that it is not always 
the science that is limiting to advance the understanding of factors influencing ecosystems, but 
the will of political systems to make decisions in controversial and uncertain circumstances.  In 
the Beaufort, R-SEA will have to contend with governance challenges which, according to Abele 
(2009), arise as a result of yesterday’s decisions being today’s immutable conditions.  In this 
respect there are three main challenges: i) making new governance arrangements work, ii) 
Canada’s old and limited approach to northern development, and iii) securing the well being of 
people. Governance and coordination challenges such as these may be addressed in part through 
R-SEA; however, given their legislative depth they will likely continue to challenge offshore 
planning and management efforts and be a significant challenge to R-SEA implementation.   
In the Beaufort Sea, implementation should take effect through a co-management 
framework, which could safeguard principles and goals outlined in the IFA and expand upon 
existing decision-making structures.  If R-SEA is to be successful, issues of government action to 
establish supportive legislation, policies and authority structures must be addressed and 
developed.  A federal - Inuvialuit management framework would therefore have corresponding 
legislation to ensure i) R-SEA is carried out, and ii) the results are enforceable under the current 
EA regime. Legislation would detail decision-making arrangements, and define responsibility, 
authority, and accountability mechanisms.  The legal basis would formalize rules and legitimize 
the R-SEA process in a manner that reflects Inuvialuit and other stakeholder interests and 
concerns.  
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5.4 R-SEA Research Needs, Directions and Opportunities  
Despite the widespread international application of SEA, it is not free from ambiguities; scholars 
and practitioners still appear divided on such fundamental matters as concept and approach 
(Jiliberto 2011; Bina 2007).  The earliest definitions of SEA were strongly grounded in EA, 
which was developed in the late 1960s.  According to Bina (2007), the fact that EA would not 
apply beyond projects to PPPs was the first, and remains the single most common reason cited as 
justification of the need for SEA.  Many of the original arguments in support of SEA therefore 
are focused on the need to overcome EA shortcomings, including inadequate consideration of 
cumulative effects (Duinker and Greig 2007); insufficient regional baseline data to detect 
environmental change (Dubé 2003); loss of mitigation opportunities because assessment 
occurred too late in the development sequence (Vicente and Partidário 2006); and limited public 
influence over the direction of development activity (O'Faircheallaigh 2010).  
 SEA has experienced a widespread adoption of its procedures internationally, as well as a 
systematic growth related to what it should address and deliver (Jiliberto 2011; Bina 2007).  The 
last decade has witnessed significant attempts to strengthen the concept of and approach to SEA, 
as a result of the progressive opening of SEA research to other disciplines, and as a response to 
advancement in practice (Bina 2007; Chaker et al. 2006).  In other words, the role of assessment 
is changing as it moves upstream, targeting the early stages in the design of development 
proposals, and the processes and contextual factors (see Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir 2007) 
that shape proposals.  The ongoing debate around the role of SEA has integrated theories from 
disciplines including planning (Richardson 2005; Eggenberger and Partidário 2000), knowledge 
and decision-making (Kørnøv and Thissen 2000) and strategy formation (Cherp et al. 2007).  
The new focus on dialogue and negotiation means assessment is becoming more participatory, 
not only in terms of involving civil society, but in seeking greater cooperation and coordination 
between government agencies, development sectors, and sources of expertise that have an 
interest or contribution to make (Bina 2007).  There is a growing prominence on the opportunity 
of using SEA as a means for rational and social forms of learning and to strengthen the capacity 
for environmental planning (Stinchcombe and Gibson 2001).  These advancements have led to 
changes in the role of SEA, and have been crucial in the development of a revised interpretation 
of its strategic dimension that has strengthened its differentiation from project-based EA.   
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While SEA is still evolving and expectations of what it can and should deliver are 
expanding, global challenges linked to increasing pressures on the natural environment are 
adding to the complexity by imposing additional challenges for SEA to contend with 
(Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch 2012).  For example, there is an opportunity for SEA to 
manage climate change issues (see Wilson and Piper 2010) by developing tools to better 
incorporate environmental thresholds and limits, yet there is only limited understanding and 
demonstrated application of climate science in SEA.  Trends of cross-fertilization with other 
disciplines are also increasingly shaping the future direction of SEA theory and policy analysis.   
Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch (2012) document a sizeable consensus in academic 
literature that the way in which SEA has evolved since the early 1990s has been a positive one, 
adding that the biggest and possibly most successful sector of SEA application has been in 
spatial terrestrial planning.  There are other sectors with extensive SEA application that have 
been well documented in academic literature, such as transportation and forestry, but there 
remains limited research on the application and efficacy of SEA in offshore energy.  Partidário 
(2011: 437) observed that “while much experience already exists, SEA is still far from a mature 
stage”; this is particularly the case in offshore oil and gas SEA.  Consistent with Vicente and 
Partidário (2006), for instance, R-SEA’s role in energy sector PPP development and assessment 
is neither well developed nor understood, and hence the nature of R-SEA remains unclear to 
many (Ketilson 2011).  
This thesis addressed the absence of research on R-SEA in offshore oil and gas planning 
and assessment through the examination of international offshore case studies, and documented 
the benefits of, but also challenges to R-SEA implementation and effectiveness.  Although SEA 
is increasingly argued as the tool of choice for regional and cumulative effects assessment, 
planning and management in the offshore (e.g., Elvin and Fraser 2012), the benefits of such have 
yet to be clearly translated or demonstrated in practice.  In the Beaufort Sea, for example, many 
participants still favoured approaching cumulative effects on an individual project scale rather at 
the regional scale, notwithstanding the volumes of literature and evidence from past practice 
about the limitations of project-based CEA and the inability to effectively assess and manage 
cumulative effects at the project scale (e.g., Bonnell and Storey 2000).  The tiered forward 
benefits of, and potential for SEA to influence next level decisions were also found to be weak, 
with limited coordination between higher and lower tiers of planning and assessment, thus 
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limiting SEA’s ability to influence development decisions.  These observed challenged or 
shortcomings, combined with the inherently restrictive nature and view of alternatives in SEA in 
the offshore sector, reflect the very issues that spurred the development of SEA as a higher-order 
planning and assessment process, operating above, but providing direction to the project tier.  
The assumption that SEA is a solution to the shortcoming of project-based EA in the offshore oil 
and gas sector was not consistently supported in the Beaufort region, and its purpose and 
expectations about its deliverables in the offshore environment differ from the ambitious 
expectations about SEA identified in the academic literature.  This knowledge provides an 
important foundation when examining R-SEA’s potential and implementation challenges and 
opportunities in the Arctic region.  
Collectively, the research results from the three manuscripts emphasize the value of 
collaborative planning theory and the need to understand context in relation to a variety of 
factors, such as cultural and political issues, that influence stakeholder decision-making and 
ultimately R-SEA.  In line with the thesis results, and as pointed out by several authors in the 
SEA community (e.g., Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir 2007; Bina and Wellington 2005; 
Cashmore and Nieslony 2005; Partidário 2005; Kørnøv and Thissen 2000), there is a need to 
understand context in relation to SEA implementation, as well to adapt SEA to the specific 
context to ensure successful implementation.  Acknowledging this, the thesis results reinforce the 
work of Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir (2007) in that understanding context is crucial to 
further our understanding of how SEA should be implemented, as well as determining reasonable 
expectations with respect to the outputs resulting from the application of SEA.  In this way, 
results also reinforce the work of Owens et al. (2004) and others who put forward arguments that 
an expert driven, objective and rational impact assessment does not necessarily align with the 
reality of planning processes.  Instead of a technocratic top down approach, current IOMP, 
BREA and IRIS initiatives in the Beaufort sustain the value of participatory civic models, 
focused on aspects such as deliberation, dialogue, and cooperation (see Jiliberto 2011).  
A key contribution of this research is that the definition of R-SEA must remain flexible 
and continue to steer away from hard positivism toward more open political (Bartlett and Kurian 
1999) and collaborative approaches, aimed at consensus-building (Owens et al. 2004; Thérivel 
and Partidário 2000).  The research illuminates the growing prominence and opportunity of using 
R-SEA as a means for learning and strengthening the capacity for environmental planning.  The 
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potential of R-SEA to strengthen public policy governance was recognized; however, future 
research is required in this regard, since no specific evaluation has been made on the subject and 
experience in this regard is ambiguous and ambivalent (OECD 2009).  A significant implication 
of this research is that while R-SEA has the potential to support good governance it should not 
be understood “as a mechanism that could promote change by acting upon the entire machinery 
of government, seeking to improve not only specific plans or projects, but also to change 
political institutions and the worldviews and behaviour associated with them” (Bina 2007).  The 
growing expectations of R-SEA thus represent both opportunities and threats, and the capacity of 
R-SEA to exert influence when there is an overload of expectation and objectives will prove a 
future challenge.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to identify how an R-SEA framework could be used in the 
Beaufort Sea region to influence planning and development decisions in a broader, more regional 
socioeconomic and environmental context than the current project-based approach.  Specifically, 
through identifying key implementation challenges and opportunities based on the perceptions of 
stakeholders, the research provided a greater understanding of how to advance R-SEA in the 
region and in doing so inform and improve the effectiveness of environmental management 
decision-making.  
It was possible to achieve the research objectives despite the research limitations.  The 
first limitation was with respect to the breadth of interviews undertaken.  While a diversity of 
stakeholders was contacted and interviewed, given the breadth of departments, agencies and 
stakeholders involved in offshore resource management there were gaps in terms of 
representation from certain regulatory authorities.  The research was also restricted to a social 
science driven approach.  Examination of the application of R-SEA in the Arctic offshore would 
be enriched by also adopting an applied science and engineering perspective, particularly to 
cumulative effects assessments and industry effects, predictions and impacts.  The Deepwater 
Horizon oil blowout in the Gulf of Mexico occurred shortly after this research began, and the 
new federal Canadian Environmental Assessment Act also came into force after the conclusion 
of this research.  Neither event was predictable or controllable, and their influence on 
participant’s views of R-SEA, and the research overall, is unknown.  
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This research provided a better understanding of how to advance R-SEA in the Beaufort 
Sea.  The need for such an initiative arises from the looming large-scale offshore hydrocarbon 
development in the region and the lack of a mechanism to plan for future energy development, 
establish a long-term regional vision, or assess and effectively manage the potential cumulative 
effects arising from development.  The urgency for R-SEA is great, given the current national 
political climate and the rapid and increasing environmental changes that are occurring in the 
region. Prime Minister Harper’s commitment to be an energy superpower is driving energy 
investment (see Hester 2007), and the relaxing of federal environmental assessment laws and 
regulations (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012) to streamline exploration, 
development and approval processes raises fears that environmental oversight will be 
diminished.  Changes to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act that significantly reduce 
the timelines for assessment and restrict the scope of federal assessment applications (see Gibson 
2012) will likely have significant effects on the value of analysis and output of project-based EA.  
Such changes further increase the need for an overarching assessment of potential effects at a 
regional level, and a development and management plan to mitigate those effects.  This is 
particularly the case given the very specific challenges that ice and extreme weather conditions 
pose for key components of Arctic offshore oil and gas development and regulation, including 
oil-spill preparedness and response, compliance and monitoring, transportation, and site 
decommissioning and remediation (Porta and Bankes 2011; Arctic Council 2009). 
With respect to environmental changes and stressors, Canada’s Arctic regions are at the 
forefront of climate change (Pearce et al. 2011; Lawrence et al. 2008; IPCC 2007).  The Arctic is 
warming at rates greater than other parts of the planet, causing shifts in baseline populations and 
ecosystem function that are poorly monitored and understood (Arctic Council 2004).  Other 
environmental challenges facing the Arctic ecosystem include the accumulation of 
environmental pollutants, the arrival of non-native species and biodiversity loss (Prowse et al. 
2009).  Despite these challenges, baseline data and understanding of ecosystem function and 
Arctic species and their environment are less complete than for many other marine ecosystems 
where offshore oil and gas development is under way (Arctic Council 2004).  The Arctic Human 
Development Report (2004), mandated under the Arctic Council, reported that Arctic societies 
are resilient, but with unprecedented rapid human induced change and stressors, biodiversity and 
humans populations are at risk.  Elvin and Fraser (2012) maintain that the juxtaposition of 
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resource abundance and fragility is an important consideration as environmental impacts of 
large-scale energy development and operation can have significant adverse consequences on 
ecosystems (e.g., Deepwater Horizon oil blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, Exxon Valdez spill in 
Alaska).  
The convergence of these trends demands more than strategic and integrative thinking – 
it demands action. This is the greatest need identified by this research.  The potential 
environmental and social risks of inaction are enormous, and this research has demonstrated that 
the current approach to offshore planning and assessment in the region is insufficient.  Improper 
cumulative effects assessments, for instance, prohibit Canada from achieving its goals under the 
Federal Sustainable Development Act (2008) and the Oceans Act (1996) of maintaining the 
integrity of resource extraction without compromising the ability of future generations to do the 
same (Elvin and Fraser 2012).  The question of whether Canada will step up and advance R-SEA 
is particularly timely given that in 2013 Canada will once again assume the Chair of the Arctic 
Council - 16 years after its first Chair in 1996-98.  Canada played an instrumental role in the 
creation of the Arctic Council, a consensus-based, high-level intergovernmental forum that 
works to promote the environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainable development in 
the region.  The question now is whether Canada will uphold that tradition of sound 
environmental management or whether we will further lag behind other Arctic nations.  Canada 
has the opportunity to lead the way to environmentally safe oil and gas development in the Arctic 
Ocean.  Recognizing the important role of R-SEA in the development of the fledging deep 
offshore Arctic oil and gas industry is a key step in moving development forward in an efficient 
and environmentally responsible manner.  
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